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[A] loss of sovereignty has occurred so that we are more subject to invisible authority-scientists and so forth. We now
think of what one should do in a certain situation, not what I
should do. Will Barrett [in The Second Coming] is a man who,
whatever his faults, has reclaimed sovereignty; he demands to
know what it's all about ....
-

Walker Percy'

* Adjunct Professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law. Resident, Pendle
Hill Quaker Study and Contemplation Center. As the text makes clear, much of this
Article is the result of a collaboration between myself and Barbara Blazek McCall, who
embodies the fact that older students who bring a full life experience to law school are
among the greatest gifts in law school teaching.
1. Linda W. Hobson, The Study of Consciousness: An Interview with Walker Percy,
35 GA. REv. 50, 51 (1981).
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Henceforth, a text, if it is living and animated, full and authentic, will be of value only by virtue of the speech it will have as
its mission to transport. Therefore, there also will be full texts
and empty texts.
- Jacques Derrida2
I. PRELUDE

In April 1990, French intellectual Jacques Derrida of
"deconstruction" fame, during a visit to the University of
Nebraska, was a member of a roundtable at the Law College.
As my part of the roundtable, I offered him a tale of welcome, a
retelling of The Wizard Of Oz. 3 In the movie, the wizard goes
back to America's heartland in his hot air balloon, but Dorothy
gets home her own way. I suggested to Derrida that the writing 4
on the balloon in which the Professor-wizard returns home
revealed its true origin and destination-on the balloon is written "STATE FAIR/OMAHA." 5 And because Omaha is not in
Kansas, Toto, I welcomed Derrida home to Nebraska.
From another perspective, political scientist Michael Genovese portrays the story of Dorothy, Toto, and the Wizard as a
political allegory of the collapse of Populism. 6 According to
Genovese, the Cowardly Lion was intended by L. Frank Baum,
the author of the original book, to be Nebraska's own Great.
Commoner, William Jennings Bryan.7

Much of Genovese's analysis is persuasive. He suggests
"Oz" itself came from the abbreviation for ounce,8 the tally of
the gold standard that Bryan denounced in his "Cross of Gold"
speech; that the tin woodsman is industrial America, which lost
its heart in the dehumanizing factories that turned workers into
machines; 9 and that the Wizard is the President, who is really a
humbug of empty rhetoric.' 0 Some of what Genovese says is not
2. JACQUES DERRIDA, THE POST CARD 473 (Alan Bass trans., 1987).

3. See L. FRANK BAUM, THE WONDERFUL WIZARD OF OZ (University of Cal. Press,
Ltd. 1986) (1900).
4. For the crucial role of writing in Derrida, see infra notes 28-32 and accompanying
text.
5.

NOEL LANGLEY ET AL., THE WIZARD OF Oz: THE SCREENPLAY 126 (Michael P.

Hearn ed., 1989).
6. Michael A. Genovese, The Wonderful Wizard Lives On: "Oz" Maintains Its

Appeal in Our PoliticalConsciousness, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1988, § 2, at 8.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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quite right. He suggests that "Toto probably represents a
dog." 1 Toto represents something much more crucial and mys12
terious-the one main character who never speaks, (s)he
unveils the Wizard, rescues Dorothy, and escapes, and is always
faithful. And the Lion's fate is different, perhaps, than Geno13
vese's judgment that he represents Bryan's lack of success.
While Bryan is unsuccessful in gaining the presidency, the lion
gets what he wants-he becomes king of the forest."
This Article is about the wizard (Derrida), the king (the
sovereign), and the scarecrow (the law reporter who wanted to
get the "brain-words" right, but got it all right when he got it
wrong). The wizard Derrida, the writer and pharmacist, brews
for us a word-philtre, which in the wrong dosage kills (Derrida
is notoriously hard to read; the reader's interest dies easily), yet
in the right amount, cures (his basic movement of deconstruction images a wonderful, minutely woven means of finding freedom in the text, in life, in law).
While the place of home, along with the mystery of Toto,
may be another story, in ours the blustery lion becomes king.
And that is the key question of law here: who is sovereign;
what does it mean, in Populist Nebraska at the turn of the century, and today, in America and her heartland, that the people
are sovereign? To answer that question, we will find that the
scarecrow, the "brains" of the outfit (the official court reporter
of the text), is a very surprising character.
II.

THE "OTHER" SIDE OF THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTION

"Sec. 26. Powers retained by people. This enumeration of
rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others, retained
by the people, and all powers not herein delegated, remain with
the people."' 15 This section of the Bill of Rights of the Nebraska
Constitution resounds (aside from its legalistic "herein") with
Populist undercurrent that moves through the law in America's
heartland and echoes the language of the unenumerated "rights
retained by the people" of the U.S. Constitution. 16 However,
11. Id.
12. Although referred to as "he" in the script, Toto is played by a female terrier,
"Terry." ALUEAN HARMETZ, THE MAKING OF THE WIZARD OF OZ 131 (1977).
13. Genovese, supra note 6, § 2, at 8.
14. In Baum's book, the lion actually goes back to the forest to reign. BAUM, supra
note 3, at 232.
15. NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 26.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The federal version of this annotation's subject is the
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section 26 is much like everything affirmative that we humans
do-it is immediately flawed. In this case, the flaw sits literally
right below the text of this heartfelt declaration of the people's
sovereignty, in the annotations provided for section 26 in the
Revised Statutes of Nebraska.
The subtext located beneath the main text of the Bill of
Rights consist of five cases. Among those annotations to section
26 is the following:
This section removes all doubt that powers other than those
specified in bill of rights were retained by the people, and any
act in violation of such rights is as clearly invalid as though
same had been expressly prohibited by fundamental law. State
v. Moores, 55 Neb. 480, 76 N.W. 175, overruled 63 Neb. 219,
88 N.W. 243.17

The aspect of the annotation holding that the Moores case is
overruled is wrong.1 8 Not only does it conflict with other annotations to the same Bill of Rights citing the very same case, but it
also ignores the inadequacy of the supposed "overruling" and
the existence of an explicit rehabilitation of that which was never
adequately overruled initially. More centrally, the annotation,
read literally to include the overruling, would erase the very section it annotates: it would negate the whole sense of section 26
and its deliniation of the retained sovereignty of the people.19
The annotation sets subtext against its primary text, against
other text, against other subtext. 20 But what makes it "wrong,"
and not merely discordant, contradictory, or incoherent, is that
it claims there is no "other side." Like most areas of law, this
fundamental area-who has the power, what is the constitution
has at least two major strands of thought, multiple lines of
cases, constant clashes, and evolving networks of authorities.
focus of considerable scholarship. See, e.g., THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE:
THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).

In the Foreword, Floyd Abrams remarks that the issue "has become a legal, philosophical,
and jurisprudential Rorschach test for the assessment of prospective judicial appointees."
Floyd Abrams, Foreword to id. at viii.
17. 2 REVISED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA 86-87 annot. (1989).
18. See id. (case cited as overruled). The correction must begin with the more local
reporters. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (1988).
19. Subtext for "the 'other' other side" would note that no written provision
"removes all doubt," so the annotation is internally flawed.
20. "Text," which comes from the Latin for "weaving," refers ordinarily to some
specific writing, like "the text of section 26." A subtext would be the writing below either literally, as in the annotations in the Revised Statutes, or figuratively, as in commentary, context, or any implicit or unspoken meaning.
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The writer of the annotations might have tried to portray one of
the major strands as the "majority rule" and another as the
"minority," but in this case the writer went too far, altogether
ignoring the existence of minority rules. This Article seeks to
restore the harmony and disharmony, the fruitful tensions, by
describing the slandered case and telling the story of the paradoxical annotation.2 1 The Article turns out, despite its author's
original intention, to be a mystery story as well.
III.

FINDING THE CASE, MOORES

Before the story, we need a setting, a context-first the setting of the author, then of the theory. When I came to the
Nebraska College of Law, I had clerked for a wonderful state
supreme court justice, Shirley Abrahamson of Wisconsin. Trying to fit my experiences into the curriculum, I taught a course
in state constitutional law. I photocopied the entire Nebraska
Constitution and annotations, as I gathered other materials for
the course. However, none of the major national materials on
state constitutional law used any Nebraska cases, and the contemporary court seemed so overwhelmingly overdocketed that
constitutional creativity was, well, "constitutionally" impossible.
Yet the older annotations gave some interesting hints; the most
prominent among those, sitting beneath section one of the Bill of
23
Rights2 2 and touching nationwide themes, was State v. Moores.
It was such a rich case that, when the class began to come alive
around the issues of power and the "law of the land," I assigned
it in full. I had found it originally under section one of the first
article of the Nebraska Constitution which states that "[a]ll persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights." 24 Only in my second year of
teaching the course, while reviewing the annotations under all
the sections of article one, did I find the contrary version under
section 26, which labeled Moores "overruled. '25 That morning,
amid panicked pre-class searching, I worried that I might somehow have been teaching an invalid case as a bright beacon in
21. You may also have noticed that the annotation itself is the loudest clue to the
"other side"-the deconstruction of my text begins already.
22. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1.

23. 76 N.W. 175 (Neb. 1898).
24. NEB. CONSr. art. I, § 1.
25. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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Nebraska law. That is what led me to discover the first layer of
its hidden history.
IV.

THE WRITTEN AND THE "UNWRITTEN"

The theoretical context for this hidden history (and its subsequent layers) is not straightforward but at its core is accessible.
There is a fundamental tension between what is written and
what is unwritten that has existed in Western civilization since
Plato (and before) and that underlies such basic debates as that
between "original intent" and "penumbra" in constitutional
interpretation.26 In its Platonic guise, it is the question of which
is more valuable, writing or speech. In its biblical guise, it is the
relationship between the law written in the heart 27 and the law
written on stone tablets, edicts, and catechisms. In one of its
most obvious legal appearances, it is the relationship between
the written and unwritten Constitution. The latter discourse has
centered on the national Constitution, but it is of course applicable to the state documents, and came to full, eloquent debate in
Nebraska around the turn of the century.
This will be a story with a historical cast. I will talk about
state justices' personalities, local political parties, particular
court reporters, Nebraska newspapers, and Omaha factions. But
it will also use some of the movement of "deconstructing" and
"reconstructing" history, which contemporary literary and legal
theories provide, because that movement will-I hope-make
the story both enlightening and fun.
In brief, I will use the key turning point (or as he calls it,
"switchpoint") of Jacques Derrida, whose writing has had
profound contemporary impact. 28 That turning point is some26. For the ongoing debate about intent, interpretation, and text, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990) (discussing
Justice Scalia's interpretation of intent); H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of OriginalIntent, 54 U. CH. L. Rnv. 1513 (1987) (reviewing R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)). For a conservative constitutional theorist
(originally from Nebraska) who cites an example of the manifest superiority of going
beyond the letter of the federal constitutional text, see David Fellman, OriginalIntent-A
Footnote, 49 REv. POL. 574 (1987).
27. As in this instance, the law written in Harte. See infra notes 146-67 and accompanying text.
28. From experience, I recommend against solely reading about Derrida rather than
reading his texts directly. If the reader wants to combine those two strategies, I recommend the following: Jonathon Culler, Jacques Derrida, in STRUCTURALISM AND SINCE:
FROM LEVI-STRAUSS TO DERRIDA 28 (John Sturrock ed., 1979); Jacques Derrida, Devant
La Loi (Avital Ronnell trans.), in KAFKA AND THE CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL PERFORM-

ANCE 40 (A. Udoff ed., 1987); Jacques Derrida, Otobiographies (Avital Ronnell trans.), in
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thing like Plato's journey in and out of the cave. In Plato's
story,29 we are like persons confined to a cave, facing the far wall
on which shadows are cast. All we see are the shadows, never
the substance. But some, by what Plato calls philosophy, manage to emerge from the cave into the sunlight. Still, it is part of
their call to return periodically to the cave and talk to the cave
dwellers who, for their part, find the journeyers a bit mad. But it
is this intercourse that creates a world of discourse and care in
which we all live together. My own interpretation of this is that
each of us spends much of our time in the cave; sometimes we
have the time, energy, care, humor, and inclination to reflect and
be called to struggle and play our way out into illumination.
Those "times out" sustain and interweave our necessary, everyday "shadow world." Rather than some people as philosophers
and some as drudges, each of us is both; every day, we are some
mix. (Perhaps even moment to moment, at our best, we dance
in, then out, of the cave--or dwell in its threshold.) But we find
the "other" side of ourselves, the one we spend less time dwelling in-whether cave or sun-a bit strange.
This is the relationship, I will suggest, between the written
and unwritten constitutions and the power in the people and the
power in the law as written. Neither has the full truth of our
lives, because we do live in a world that has both cave and sun.
We also live in a world that has both written and unwritten,
both known and mysterious, both speech and script, both obvious and subtle. Derrida turns the usual dual hierarchies on their
heads, and turns, and returns. While this risks the equanimity of
the reader, his basic move is not too hard to track-and it contains, I hope we will find, some surprises.30 One is that what is
"unwritten" is also written-but the writing happens someplace
134 (Chriske V. McDonald ed. & Peggy Kamuf trans., English
ed. 1985); Jacques Derrida, Plato's Pharmacy, in DISSEMINATION 65 (Barbara Johnson
trans., 1981); Linda Kintz, In-Different Criticism, in THE THINKING MUSE: FEMINISM
AND MODERN FRENCH PHILOSOPHY 113 (Jeffner Allen & Iris M. Young eds., 1989); see
also Francis J. Mootz, III, The OntologicalBasis ofLegal Hermeneutics. A ProposedModel
of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer,Habermas, and Ricour, 68 B.U. L. REv. 523,
533-39 (1988) (suggesting a context for Derrida and notable contemporaries in contextual
play in an accessible format). See generally J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practiceand Legal
Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987).
29. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 222-30 (Francis M. Cornford trans., 1941).
30. "I have never confused-indeed I have never stopped urging others not to confuse-traces or writing generally with what is said or written in books and newspapers,
with archives and 'publications.'" Jacques Derrida, Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments, 15 CRITICAL INQUIRY 812, 816 (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1989).
THE EAR OF THE OTHER
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other than we expect. 1
The first move, for which Derrida is perhaps most famous,
is to seem to put more importance on the written text than on
anything else. Reversing the supposed Platonic (and commonsense) valuation of speech (because it is immediate, direct, particular, from this person to that person), he appears to say that
what is written is what makes things real. There is nothing
outside the text, and the text governs.32
In one's ordinary life, this seems absurd. You live your life;
you do some reading and writing, but most of your life is walking, talking, thinking, moving, feeling, deciding-activities
sometimes using but all without being dictated by written words.
Derrida subtly suggests that something like the pop-psych
notion of being "scripted," of having "tapes" in our heads, of
internalizing someone else's written words and being dictated to
(our always "taking dictation"), is closer to how we live than we
may realize. In moments of reflection or distress, we may ask
ourselves whether we are part of a plan. If we are part of a plan,
is it like Fate, set and determined, or is it like Augustine's version of God's plan: the world made anew every day. We may
ask: anew every moment or both?33 Perhaps we are free only in
appearance, and are actually enslaved by psychological, sociological, familial, pedagogical, and even theological determinisms? Are we some mix? Is this "mix" free? Derrida's writing
is a way of beginning to turn all these basic categories and questions of life around each other, to move them (and us), so we
might gain new perspectives and get a sensation, an intuition, of
freedom. And in all the thinking about free will and determinism, about law and liberty, about what is written and what is up
for grabs, from one perspective that may be the best we can dohave an educated sensation, never finally rebutted, of freedom.
Some commentators see this sort of movement as destructive nihilism ("trashing"), challenging the stable structure, the
law of what is, with no grounds for affirming that there will be
something else better.34 I see it as based on the tacit premise of
hope, that if we do leave the known cave for the unknown sun31. See, e.g., id. at 815-17.
32. This is a common reading of JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY
(Gayatori C. Spiuak trans., 1976). For a quick antidote, see Derrida, Plato's Pharmacy,
supra note 28, at 148-49.
33. See supra notes 26-29.

34. See Ted Finman, CriticalLegal Studies, Professionalism, and Academic Freedom:
Exploring the Tributariesof Carrington'sRiver, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 180 (1985); P.W. Mar-
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light freely (or vice-versa, as some are more naturally sun dwellers), we will better understand the shadows when we return. If
we look at the written as we previously saw the unwritten, and
the unwritten as we used to view the written, we will gain in
wisdom. New and multiple perspectives add more than they disorient. Thus, Derrida's challenge to the supposed primacy of
speech turned philosophy of language on its ear, upsetting the
basic notion that what we experience in direct relationship is
more valid than what comes on the anonymous written page.
Yet a moment later Derrida inverts this new insight. What is
"written" includes what is written in the heart, he says, and
what is in books is not necessarily true text. 35 And we are back
to where we started. Well, so was Dorothy after she visited Oz,
and while both she and her home were the same, they were also
very different.3 s
Yahweh tells us that the law S/He gives, S/He writes on
our hearts,3 7 but the laws were also written on Moses's tablets.
We have law "on the books," and law we hold in our "inward
parts." We have a legal system and full statute books, and we
have our own inherent sense of justice. Which to honor? What
is writing on the heart-or of the heartland? Perhaps it is the
process of unraveling and reweaving these answers and questions
into a different "both/and," which Derrida suggests-and demonstrates. That is what he does in his own text. So I will try to
unravel and reweave the written annotations and the written
and unwritten subtexts of the Nebraska Constitution in sections
1 and 26 of article I,38 and we will see what happens.
V.

THE TEXT: VOLUME

Two

The Nebraska Constitution appears in text in a set of
volumes of the Nebraska statutes numbered through six; volume
II (or "2")3 9 is, it says on the title page, "comprising the constitution of Nebraska and all the statutory laws of a general nature
tin et al., "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 1 (1985).
35. See supra text accompanying note 28.
36. And her own way home, which was not via the Professor's hot air balloon, is the
key thing Derrida, to some extent, misses. "Derrida's brilliant readings have been centered
on a subject who is male, white, European; then that critique of subjectivity has been generalized .... " Kintz, supra note 28, at 115.
37. See 20 Exodus.
38. NEB. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 26.
39. The spine says "2" while the title page says "II."
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in force at date of publication on the subjects assigned to chapters 24 to 26, inclusive. ' 4° There is no table of contents, but a
page-by-page examination shows the title page4 ' is first, followed
by a copyright page, 42 a page containing the certificate of
authentication,43 and a page containing a short statement on
citation form.44 Next is a list of the editorial staff,45 and then,
unannounced, The Declaration of Independence. 46 The discourse of the volume begins in this Declaration: "When in the
Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to
dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with
another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God entitle them . . . ."47 It continues, saying that
when any form of government becomes destructive to the ends
of equal rights of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, it is the
right of the people to alter or abolish it.48 That is what volume
two begins with-the national declaration of an exercise of the
power of the people.
Next in the book is The Enabling Act of Congress, passed
April 19, 1864, which permits the people of Nebraska to form a
Constitution and state government and admits Nebraska to the
Union.49 Then comes the actual admission, February 9, 1867,50
and the Proclamation of Admission by President Andrew Johnson on March 1, 1867. 51 The text continues with the Constitution of the United States,52 the declaration of this Union that the
Nebraska heartland chose to enter. Then come the Nebraska
Constitution of 1875 and "subsequent amendments."53
Many states have revised their constitutions, some many
times. Nebraska continues with its basic document intact, but
the subtext changes it. The Preamble itself has not been
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

2 REVISED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA, supra note 17 (title page).
Id.
Id. (copyright page).
Id. (certificate of authentication page).
Id. (statement of citation page).
Id. (list of editorial staff page).

46. Id. at 1.
47. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776); see Craig M. Lawson, The Literary Force of the Preamble, 39 MERCER L. REV. 879, 879-87 (1988).
48. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
49. 2 REVISED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA, supra note 17, at 5-9.
50. Id. at 10-13.
51. Id. at 14-15.
52. Id. at 16-35.
53. Id. at 37, 45.
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amended since 1875.14 "Preamble. We, the people, grateful to
Almighty God for our freedom, do ordain and establish the following declaration of rights and frame of government, as the
Constitution of the State of Nebraska. '15 5 Underneath the Preamble is one annotation, the first in volume two: "Omaha
National Bank v. Spire, 223 Neb. 209, 389 N.W.2d 269
(1986)."56 In the text, the annotation looks forbidding to one
who desires to resurrect the unwritten constitution of Nebraska.
57
It condenses the case to a seeming erasure of "We, the people":
The Preamble cannot exert any power to secure the declared
objects of the Constitution unless, apart from the Preamble,
such power can be found in, or can be properly implied from,
some express delegation in the Constitution. Omaha Nat.
Bank v. Spire, id. at 216, 389 N.W. 2d at 274.8
If the power starts in the people, and they try to write down
what powers they delegate to a government they call into existence but they retain any powers they did not so delegate, how
can this annotation make sense? The declared objects of the Preamble are establishing a frame of government and declaring of
rights. Among the rights declared is that all rights not enumerated stay with the people. But their Preamble cannot help the
people retain power unless the power can be found in the express
delegation-yet the declaration of rights says what is unexpressed is retained. Is this as nonsensical as it seems?
The Omaha NationalBank 9 case is about a constitutional
initiative. Under the Nebraska constitution, the people of
Nebraska have direct access to amend their constitution. Fewer
than half of the states have such a populist provision in their
constitution. 60 The Nebraska Supreme Court notes the straightforward way the initiative ballot spoke to the voters: "A vote
54. The amendment changed the initial Preamble of 1866: "We the people of
Nebraska, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, in order to secure its blessings, form
a more perfect government, insure domestic tranquility, and promote the general welfare,
do establish this Constitution." NEB. CONST. pmbl. (1866). For a discussion of reclaiming
the "blessings" of freedom and law, see Emily F. Hartigan, The Powerof LanguageBeyond
Words: Law as Invitation, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 63 (1991).
55. NEB. CONST. pmbl.
56. 2 REVISED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA, supra note 17, at 45.
57. NEB. CONST. pmbl.

58. Id.
59. Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Spire, 389 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. 1986).
60. See James M. Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to

State ConstitutionalJurisprudence,11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43, 44 n.5 (1983). The initiative itself survived federal constitutional challenge. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).

1144

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

FOR will create a constitutional prohibition against further
purchase of Nebraska farm and ranch lands by any corporation
'61
or syndicate other than a Nebraska family farm corporation.
The appellants argued that the initiative was a statute, not a constitutional amendment. The court rather directly said that
under the power of initiative, if the voters say it's a constitutional amendment, it's an amendment. 62 Trying to use the Preamble to say that only things that fit the declared objects of the
Preamble (the "ends of government") are amendments, anything
else being a mere statute, takes from the people the right to say
what is a statute and what is an amendment.63
For "power of the people," what looked ominous in the
annotation looks much more promising in the body of the
opinion:
The ultimate source of power in any democratic form of government is the people. Our Nebraska Constitution is a document belonging to the people. Subject only to the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution, the people may put in
their document what they will. Even to the shock and dismay
of constitutional theoreticians, the people may add provisions
dealing with "non-fundamental" rights, as well as provisions
bearing the most tenuous of relationships to the notion of what
constitutes the basic framework of government. The people
may add provisions which legal scholars might decry as legislative or statutory in nature. But the people may do it
nonetheless. 64
Using heartland tornado imagery of which I am particularly
fond, the court took a very direct, very democratic view of what
the initiative process entails:
The motivations and mental processes of the voter in Verdigre
or the elector in Elkhorn cannot be determined-except from
the words of the enactment itself. Beyond that, all that can be
known by this court is that the voters have been subjected to
tornado-like winds in voting on this highly political question.65
Even with an outrageous work overload, the court had creativ61.
62.
63.
national

Omaha Nat'l Bank, 389 N.W.2d at 273.
Id. at 274.
State constitutions are notorious for having a great deal of detail that would at the
level be statutory, but in the states is just part of the elastic reach of a more local

"constitution." Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our
Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928, 942-43 (1968).
64. Omaha Nat'! Bank, 389 N.W.2d at 275.
65. Id. at 279.
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ity. The court also had insight, for tornado-like winds, as Dorothy comes to realize, can bring unexpected good fortune.
This first foray into the text's subtext, a 1986 initiative case,
indicates that the annotations are misleading-as anything so
condensed is likely to be. Is there some more consistent problem
in this writing about writing and not writing, in this annotationlevel subtext to the written-and-unwritten text? If the powers
are still in the people as the Omaha NationalBank case suggests,
then there are powers as yet unwritten-can only the people
write them directly by initiative? This does not seem correct,
because it was the people who created the judiciary and the legislature. What does the judiciary think should be deciphered
among the writings and the people?
Let us return to the text. The next entry in volume two,
after the Preamble and its singular contemporary annotation, is
the "Index to Article I, Bill of Rights. ' 66 The index lists section
one as "Statement of rights." Section 26 is listed as "Powers
retained by the people."' 67 We can scan in the index and find
those two key rights and powers sections.
Under section one itself, there is more than a page of annotations. One is to State v. Moores6 8: "Bill of rights is not
enumeration of all powers reserved to the people."' 69 There is no
mention of Moores as overruled, like there is in the annotation
under section 26.70 What happened in Moores, that it can still
stand for the people's retention of unenumerated rights, and yet,
when cited for the proposition that "powers other than those
specified in bill of rights were retained by the people," annotation number two71 tells us that it has been overruled?
Moores is a remarkable case. When I first read it, I knew
next to nothing about Nebraska and took the case as written,
without much context. It was filed June 23, 1898, by the state,
against the mayor of Omaha. The legislature in Lincoln had
passed a statute giving the governor in Lincoln the power to
appoint four members of the board of fire and police commissioners of the city of Omaha,72 yet the mayor went ahead and
66. 2 REVISED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA, supra note 17, at 45.

67. Id.
68. 76 N.W. 175 (Neb. 1898).
69. 2 REVISED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA, supra note 17, at 47.

70. See supra text accompanying note 17.
71. 2 REVISED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA, supra note 17, at 86-87. I will not count
the Preamble annotation, as it is to something that has no substance according to itself.
72. See infra Part XV.
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appointed his own. The court concluded that the statute violated
the right to local self-government which was retained by the people at the time the Constitution was adopted.73 The opinion was
written by Justice Norval and Commissioner Ragan, and the dissent by Commisioner Ryan. Chief Justice Harrington concurred
in the majority opinion. Justice Sullivan and Commissioner
Irvine joined the dissent.
Within the text of the Moores opinion are several powerful
texts from other states, most notably one by Justice Cooley of
Michigan, 74 but the Nebraska court does more than string
together the thoughts of other courts. Early in the sixty-page
opinion, the court states:
[There is] no express provision in the constitution of this state
which gives municipal corporations the power to select their
officers or to manage their own affairs, nor is there any clause
to be found in that instrument which in express terms inhibits
the legislature from conferring upon the governor the power to
appoint municipal officers to manage and control purely local
affairs."
Norval and Ragan find that the retained power may be "by
implication as well as by expression" 76 and conclude that "[t]he
denial to the people of the right to govern themselves is undemocratic, and if such doctrine is enforced, we could no longer boast
of 'a government of the people, for the people, and by the people.' "77 In that conclusion, the court actually uses what commentators mean by the unwritten constitution. 78 Citation of the
Gettysburg Address, which is not formal judicial precedent, is a
reference beyond the text of the Constitution printed in volume
two of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska. It is a reference even
beyond the annotations that are scattered beneath the "main
text" of the Constitution. It spreads farther than the volumes of
the Nebraska Reports. It may even be the first use in Nebraska
"precedent" of Lincoln's phrase, and thus the first reaching
beyond the canon that had existed until the Civil War, for this
73. State v. Moores, 76 N.W. 175, 188 (Neb. 1898).
74. See People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 47 (1871) (Cooley, J., dissenting).
75. Moores, 76 N.W. at 177.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 188 (quoting Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address (1863)).
78. For a discussion of the unwritten constitution, see Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 7 (1984); Thomas C. Grey, Originsof the Unwritten

Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv.
843 (1978); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
1127 (1987).
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state that was admitted to Union on the cusp of the country
resurrected from its deepest self-mutilation. The court was at
once reaching into a text beyond volume two, beyond the
Nebraska Reports, beyond The FederalistPapers and Washington's Farewell Address, and beyond the near-death of the Union.
Was it reaching for (and from) this place where the people retain
their rights, where they are the source of power and sovereignty?
Its contemporary locus includes places recognizable as
highly controversial, such as Justice Douglas's penumbra 79 and
aspirant justice Bork's desire to reverse decades of precedent 8 0 to overturn Lochner,81 the key case in deflecting substantive due
process from economic matters. Some would recognize one (or
both) of those ventures as overreaching, some as still underreaching. But the general topology reveals the layers of context
for volume two's supposedly obvious text. Part of that text in
volume two is, I would argue, sufficient both to point continuously outside itself and remain at war internally. One version of
both that war and that pointing is the tension between the writ82
ten and the unwritten constitution.
Moores will not answer the questions about the scope of the
unwritten, but it does give eloquent testimony to the existence of
this dangerous idea, this notion of something still living in the
people who wrote the text that is more powerful, at least potentially, than the printed page naively viewed. The Moores court
deals with this idea of the unwritten in the language of its culture, one that we can still remember, if dimly: the biblical language of letter and spirit. Just as Lincoln, who belonged to no
organized church and was recognizably not sectarian, used the
vocabulary and rhythms of the Bible, so do the justices writing
and quoting in Moores. 3 But also recognizable, and nearly as
79. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
80. See generally, Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, OriginalIntent, and Economic
Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 823 (1986) (discussing constitutional interpretation as it
pertains to economic regulations).
81. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
82. A resolution is not a matter of pursuing the "rules" of annotations further. In
many states, annotations are explicitly of no authoritative value, but that rule is often
ignored. Other states do not even have such a rule. Experience tells me that annotations
have tremendous real authority. See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do
We Tell the Same Stories: Law Reform, Critical Librarianship,and the Triple Helix
Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REv. 207 (1989) (discussing problems of classification); J.M.
Feinman, The Jurisprudenceof Classification, 41 STAN. L. REv. 661 (1989) (same).
83. See generally NORTHROP FRYE, THE GREAT CODE: THE BIBLE AND LITERATURE (1981).
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elusive today, is the language of sister state courts. 4
In New York, the courts cited the spirit of the state law,
even when it was not within the strict letter of the law, decrying
a "literal reading only" as "'palpably in evasion of [the state
law's] spirit.' ",85 Again in New York, in addressing what those
inherent rights were that the people retain, the court said the
rights were " 'undefined, and perhaps undefinable by any general
code,'" and that the people could not part with them. 6 What
one cannot part with is unalienable. To tap those rights, the
people are not "compelled to point out the exact article, section,
clause, or phrase" that grants or denies a right when seeking
recourse in the full measure of the organic law rather than in the
mere, or strict, letter.8 7 Otherwise, to write a constitution would
be "'to weaken, if not endanger, those unnoticed [rights and
powers].' ",8 Tapping both the idea of local governance reminiscent of New England town meetings and the heart of American
democracy, Moores notes that "[t]he right of the majority to
govern is as much reserved to the people as though such right
had been in apt language expressed in the constitution."' 9 While
it is unlikely that anyone could seriously doubt that a founding
premise of American democracy is majority rule, this premise is
not specified in the federal Constitution. Of course, the immediate question is majority rule by whom? In this case, the majority
of the state or the city?
The Moores answer is that all the people have the right of
local self-government in local matters; all the citizens of the state
have the right to be partly state, partly local and, eventually,
partly (or even mostly) federal. How does the court know this
right exists? Cooley tells us that" '[s]ome things are too plain to
be written.' "9 Indiana says that "[b]efore written constitutions,
the people possessed the power of local self-government"
because "'all power is inherent in the people.' "91 These cases
84. Shirley S. Abrahamson, CriminalLaw and State Constitutions: The Emergence of
State ConstitutionalLaw, 65 TEx. L. REv. 1141, 1181 (1985).
85. State v. Moores, 76 N.W. 175, 178 (Neb. 1898) (quoting People v. Albertson, 55
N.Y. 50, 55 (1873)).
86. Id. (quoting People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325, 328 (N.Y. 1835)).
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Morris, 13 Wend. at 328).
89. Id. at 179.
90. Id. at 182 (quoting People v. Hurlburt, 24 Mich. 44 (1871) (Cooley, J.,
concurring)).
91. Id. at 185 (quoting City of Evansville v. State, 21 N.E. 267, 270 (Ind. 1888)).
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are not California in the 1960s, but rather the heartland in the
nineteenth century.
[W]hat is constitutional freedom? ... Constitutional freedom
certainly does not consist in exemption from governmental
interference in the citizen's private affairs; in his being
unmolested in his family, suffered to buy, sell, and enjoy property, and generally to seek happiness in his own way. All this
might be permitted by the most arbitrary ruler, even though he
allowed his subjects no degree of political liberty. The government of an oligarchy may be as just, as regardful of private
rights, and as little burdensome as any other .... It would be
necessary... to point out to [a protesting people] ... where

and by what unguarded words the power had been conferred.
Some things are too plain to be written. If this charter of state
government, which we call a constitution, were all there was of
constitutional command; if the usages, the customs, the maxims, that have sprung from the habits of life, modes of thought,
methods of trying facts by the neighborhood, and mutual
responsibility in neighborhood interests, the precepts which
have come from the revolutions which overturned tyrannies...
which impelled our ancestors to summon the local communities to redress local evils.., if a recognition of all these were to
be stricken from the body of our constitutional law, a lifeless
skeleton might remain, but the living spirit, that which gives it
force and attraction, which makes it valuable and draws to it
the affections of the people, that which distinguishes it from the
numberless constitutions, so called, which in Europe have been
set up and thrown down.., many of which, in their expressions, have seemed equally fair and to possess equal promise
with ours, and have only been wanting in the support and vitality which these alone can give-this living and breathing spirit,
which supplies the interpretation of the words of the written
charter, would be utterly lost and gone.92
Because the annotations did not tell me what had happened to
the retained sovereignty of the people, I had to go to the next
level of text. Volume two of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska
was no longer sufficient.
VI.

BEYOND VOLUME

Two

Each volume of the Nebraska Reports is compiled by an
official reporter. In 1898, D.A. Campbell was the reporter for
volume 55, in which Moores appears. As is usual for state
92. Id. at 182-83.
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reporters, the case as reported consisted of headnotes, captions,
and the body of the opinion. Volume 63, spanning 1901 and the
first term of 1902, contained the case that "overruled" Moores.
This volume had a different reporter, Lee Herdman. Although
Herdman went out with volume 66, he was a voluble annotator.
His prefatory Reporter's Notes to volume 63 include a discussion
of the nature offacta and dicta; he maintainsfacta is "what the
court does and not what it says in the doing. ' 93 What it says in
the doing is mere dicta. Keeping an eye on what the court does,
he says, requires a single perspective. 94 Herdman criticizes cases
that have been "discussed in a spirit of partisan bias oftener than
with an eye single to the discovery of the truth," 95 and he cites
as an96example the decision of Chief Justice Taney in Dred
Scott.

Herdman writes that Taney supposedly delivered the

majority decision, but his reasoning-that Scott because of his
race and pedigree could not be a citizen-itself undermined the
very basis on which Taney's and all decisions must rest: jurisdiction. 97 Herdman concludes that because there was no jurisdiction, the opinion on the merits could not be expressed
consistently with the (jurisdiction-destroying) views of the
majority, including Taney himself, so that the entire opinion is
dicta sine cera.98 Expansively, Herdman notes that "[a]s long as
human minds are differently constituted, no two logicians will
arrive at the same goal by the same route." 99 He has told us a
deconstructive version of what overruling means: there is partisan bias if there is no single eye to truth, and there is no single
way to truth. Then Herdman adds what Derrida does not entail:
he says the goal is illusory; there is no decision in Dred Scott."co
What does this prescient, post-deconstructive reporter do
with thisfacta-dicta tension, with dicta sine cera, and with what
reporters do? To cheat, I will tell you part of the "last page" of
a chapter of the story. In volume 63, Herdman adds an advocate's view to the case supposedly overturning Moores, the
Redell case, 10 1 via extensive reporter's notes at the end of the
93. Lee Herdman, Reporter's Notes to 63 NEBRASKA REPORTS at vii (1901-02).

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 395 (1856).
97. Herdman, supra note 93, at viii.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. This is nihilism. Derrida might call Dred Scott a suicidal text, but he would
likely consider it a decision. See infra note 245.
101. Redell v. Moores, 88 N.W. 243 (Neb. 1901).
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case (annotations right in mid-volume). 10 2 In the same volume,
volume 63, he does not list Redell as overruling. Even in volume
64, Moores trumps Seavey, 0 3 but Redell is not yet over Moores.
In volume 65, Herdman's last as reporter of cases (though he
lingers in half-life in 66),104 comes the coup: in section four of
"Digest of Nebraska Cases Overruled, Modified, Distinguished,
105 It
Negatived and To Be Compared," we find State v.0Moores.
6
is listed under "IV. OVERRULED IN TOTO."'
Of course, right under State v. Moores is this same
reporter's continuance of the earlier entry: "State v. Seavey,
overruled by Moores."'1 7 If Moores is overruled in toto, does
this not resurrect Seavey? At the least, does it make Moores retrospectively unable to overpower Seavey? Does Moores make
the cases cancel out? Our prolix reporter Herdman, who holds
forth at some length about the section on overruling, etc., and
comments profusely about Redell (more so than was formal
practice at the time in the Nebraska Reports) seems to embody
(but not state) the view that deconstruction does not fully
destroy, for the ghost of Moores still holds Seavey impotent.
Herdman's dicta ("overruled in toto") are nihilistic, but his
actions, his facta, are less total.
Meanwhile, Redell is facing its three-year-old foe, Moores.
In the Redell case, John Redell, chief of the Omaha fire department, 0 stands before the board of police and fire commissioners
on charges that could result in his removal. The Redell court
sets the case up as one of the authority of the commissioners,10 9
which rests, in turn, on the statute: section 169 of chapter 12a of
the Nebraska Compiled Statutes."0 Briefly stated, the court's
conclusion is that section 169, which allows the board of commissioners to remove the fire chief when necessary for the more
effective working of the fire department, is valid."'
The way the court got there, and the concrete results of the
102. Herdman, supra note 93, at 232-33.

103. State v. Seavey, 35 N.W. 228 (Neb. 1887).
104. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
105. Lee Herdman, Reporter's Notes to 65 NEBRASKA REPORTS at xlii (1902).

106. Id. "IN TOTO" - this is particularly perplexing news to me. See Hartigan,
supra note 54.
107. Herdman, supra noe 105, at xlii.
108. John Redell was appointed in 1895. See FRANK J. BERKLEY, THE FADED
FRONTIER 344 (1935).

109. Redell v. Moores, 88 N.W. 243, 243 (Neb. 1901).
110. NEB. COMP. STAT. § 12a:169 (1897).

111. Redell, 88 N.W. at 247.
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case, are quite a story. The face of the case suggests that Redell,
who is fire chief under an unknown appointment power, is at
odds with Moores and his fellows on the board, and the court
will not let the board get rid of Redell. However, the statutes
that Redell brings back to life seem to include some not at issue
in the case. How did sections 166 and 167, which are not
involved in the board's removal actions,12 come alive in a dispute
over section 169, the removal statute?
The dissent gives the answer, but the thrust of Redell
should be explained first. Only two justices were present and
voting. While Norval prevailed in Moores, he is the lone dissent
in Redell.11 Sullivan, dissenting loudly in Moores, concurs with
commissioner Albert, who is also joined by commissioners Duffle and Ames. 1 4 Harrison is gone, and no third justice appears.
The encounter between the old adversaries, Sullivan and Norval,
reverses, and Albert adds spin.
The reverse spin is dizzying. Albert asks, in false innocence, about the fate of section 169 once Moores is in place:
"Assuming that the majority opinion in [Moores] is the settled
law of the state, the question arises whether section 169... must
fall with [in sections 166 and 167]."115 He goes through the

canons of severance of sections, which mandate maximizing constitutionality (never mentioning why the Moores court did not
reach out and grab section 169 to overturn it), and cites the
defendant's (Moores's) argument that the act on its face consists
of separate sections.11 6 The court in Redell acknowledges that
construction rules require that the court sever what it can to
presume constitutionality ("severance" of 169, never "attached"
by the litigants, would resolve the case against Redell),1 7 but
Sullivan's side becomes expansive. They argue that the mere
words of the act, if used by themselves and out of context
"would be unintelligible,- a jumble of words without meaning."' 18 The court is telling us, as it overturns Moores, that text
is meaninglesswithout context. The Redell decision broadens the
context, enlarging the relevant "text" of section 169. (The challenge, recall, is to the existing board's power under section 169
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.

243-44.
248 (Norval, J., dissenting).
247 (Albert, J., concurring).
245 (Albert, J., concurring).
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to remove its own chief, Redell.) They ask whether sections 166
and 167 "served as an inducement to the legislature for the passage of [section 169]." 119 They begin to form an attachment to
169 out of sections not before the court.
Being "realistic," Albert and Sullivan argue that the court
is not required to divest itself of all knowledge save that gleaned
from the act. They assert that they can refer to "what they
know of the history of the country and of the law," "of the public necessities felt," of the "general state of opinion, public, judicial and legislative at the time of enactment" and of the "history
...topography and general conditions" of a country.2 0 What
they conclude is that the reason any legislation' 2 was passed
was because of section 169's portion of the governor's appoint22
ment power, so the rest of the litigated sections come along.1
By this inversion, a case brought under section 169,123 reaches
sections in a much larger act that, as the dissent notes, no one in
the case ever mentioned. 2 4 This broader context, allowing the
court to construe in retrospect, gives it jurisdiction over a section
not before the court, and what the court really wants, a foothold
against Moores. Next, the Redell court claims that, as section
169 brings 166 and 167125 along in tow (and thus the Moores
case), it can, by other than mere dicta, overturn Moores.12 6 In a
sort of Dred Scott in reverse, miming reporter Herdman's erasure of jurisdiction, the Redell court gains purchase and creates
jurisdiction over what it considers the real issue: local
government.
In the context created so far, this is not necessarily impossible. What is really at issue is Omaha's ability to select its own
officials. But the Redell court has to cut its own lines in order to
reach this issue-it has to step far beyond the words of the statute and make connections based on some common issue it per119. Id.
120. Id. at 246 (Albert, J., concurring).

121. They are inexact about the outer boundaries of this legislative package.
122. Redell, 88 N.W. at 246 (Albert, J.,
concurring).
123. Redell's original brief barely mentions "the Omaha charter," as he says the
board claims to act primarily under Omaha ordinances. Plaintiff's Petition in Equity at 2,
Redell v. Moores, 88 N.W. 243 (Neb. 1901) (No. 12,124).
124. Redell, 88 N.W. at 247 (Norval, J., dissenting). We are given no hint of the fate
of §§ 1-165, and the question remains as to whether there is a § 170.
125. The statute was passed in 1897 (§§ 166-169), replacing older § 145, and
remained unchanged until it was replaced by §§ 58-60 in 1905. See Lee Herdman,
Reporter'sNotes to 55 NEBRASKA REPORTS 182 (1898).

126. Redell, 88 N.W. at 246-47 (Albert, J., concurring).
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ceives in the passage of the bills, a commonality not available in
the words of the text or its judicial history. The "history,"
"opinion," "purpose," and "real political" context of the statute-in which an exhaustive "spelling-out" of all the potential
ties among contexts would be impossible-allowed the Redell
court to overrule the idea of history, opinion, purpose, and
broader context. What the Redell court banished in theorythat the text requires context, which can never be fully specified-it reinstates within its own order of banishment. What it
claims to silence, it shouts among its own words. The unwritten
beyond and behind the written, supposedly "killed" by the
Redell decision, is written all over the Redell opinion, and its
spirit prevails.
Redell takes Moores's poison in order to kill Moores, and
thus kills itself, executing a suicidal argument while claiming
that this is what Moores did. In considering whether there is an
inherent right to local self-government, the Redell group states:
So far as the individual members of society are concerned, in
the nature of things, there can be no such thing as an inherent
right of local self-government. The right of local self-government is purely a political right, and all political rights, of necessity, have their foundation in human government. For an
individual to predicate an inherent right-a right inborn and
inbred-on a foundation of human origin involves a contradiction of terms. So far as a city is concerned, considered in the
character of an artificial being, it is a creature of the legislature.
It can have no rights save those bestowed upon it by its creator.
...In other words, the power to create implies the power to
impose upon the creature such limitations as the creator may
12 7
will, and to modify or even destroy what has been created.
The court takes a plausible argument that cities are the artifacts
of legislatures, so legislatures may, therefore, do as they please
with their cities, 128 and slips the argument into the place
reserved for the people. The rationale begins by saying the individual can have no political rights, but switches unannounced to
the city as the unit of analysis, the subject of the sentence, the
(dispossessed) focus of rights. We may debate whether cities do
or do not have rights, 129 but in American jurisprudence people
certainly do, the most fundamental of which is the right to
127. Id. at 247 (Albert, J., concurring).

128. This view requires an omnipotent legislature, a single-cause universe.
129. Other corporations, by way of the fiction of corporate personhood, do.
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remain (within and as) a people and not just as individuals. The
Declaration of Independence was a communal declaration. It
was not several thousands of single declarations, or, if it was, it
was simultaneously the declaration of nearly all of them
together. It is the people, not the persons, who retain the power.
The Nebraska and United States Constitutions contain in their
preambles and in their reserved powers sections a statement of
where sovereignty rests. Political sovereignty can only rest in a
people; sovereignty is a relational term, requiring more than one
atomistic soul in order to "apply" to the world. Where did this
human government, which the Redell court says founds all
political rights, come from? Is the use of "creator" language
telling here? Does the Redell court think the government is the
creator ex nihilo? Does the government create not only the people but also the person? If not, then indeed there are inalienable
rights, "inborn and inbred." "The people" are not "the government," and "the government" is not "the people." Such an
equation would be raw statism or totalitarianism.
Why would the Redell court make such a move? It has
mistaken its author. Just as it takes on too facilely the language
of the creator, it deals too quickly with the notion of authority. 30 In its unannounced slide from citizen to city, openly calling the latter (and covertly calling the former) "an artificial
being" having "no rights save those bestowed upon it by its creator," the court concludes "[w]e shall not attempt to review the
authorities bearing on this question." 3 ' The court cites no
authority. Yet it continues, after raising the specter that haunts
the whole opinion-that "elusive something, elastic and uncertain as an unwritten constitution"' 32 --to the incomprehensible
conclusion that Moores "is unsupported by a single authority. '1 33 For sixty pages, case after case and state after state
speak in Moores giving their names, and yet Redell does not see
34
a single authority.
130. See J. VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986).
131. Redell, 88 N.W. at 247 (Albert, J., concurring).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. After the dust settles on the central four cases (State v. Savage, 90 N.W. 898
(Neb. 1902); Redell v. Moores, 88 N.W. 243 (Neb. 1901); State v. Kennedy, 83 N.W. 87
(Neb. 1900); State v. Moores, 76 N.W. 175 (Neb. 1898)) dealing with the Omaha police
commission, the locals are dismissed by a justice who says the consideration of authorities
(the Moores cases and their counterparts) cannot be allowed to interfere "with other duties
that can not be postponed." State v. Broatch, 94 N.W. 1016, 1023 (Neb. 1903). Postponement, or deferral, is key to Derrida's "diffdrence."
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Redell is a case without authority, brooking no other
authority-in what realm does it function? I would suggest that
it is the realm of the unreal. 135 In a spare eight lines of dissenting text, it is noted that the Moores case was never mentioned by
either party let alone argued to the court. 136 The Redell case is
made up of whole cloth. There is nothing "real" in the Redell
decision, nothing of an openly contested case there.
Herdman, via reporter's notes, at least made an attempt at
an unvacuous defense of Redell when it supposedly "appeared"
in 1901, which he put in volume 63 immediately after the
case. 137 He suggests that the New England notion of town governance does not apply to a new state like Nebraska. 138 In
Rhode Island, he remarks, local government was a vested right,
but that was not the case in the heartland. 139 Of course, Herdman never announces what does govern: is it the land that governs? Is it the plat map that governs? Or are the rights of the
people a matter of the people, not "who got here first," the
homesteaders or the government survey team. Herdman tries in
the 1901 notes to say Cooley didn't know what he was doing:"
"The separate opinion of Judge Cooley [in Moores] seems not to
agree -with the doctrine laid down in his work, Constitutional
Limitations."' 14 1 But even he slips backward over the edge:
"[The Michigan case that Cooley wrote] is a construction of an
express provision of the state constitution."142 Herdman suggests that Cooley was not only confused about his own doctrine,
but was finally deluded, moved needlessly to eloquence concern1 43
ing the lack of an express provision about local government.
Despite Cooley's and all other parties' inability to locate that
provision, Herdman announces (but does not recite) an anonymous, unspecified, "express" provision. "4
135. Sullivan briefly adds a raw but revealing note to the chorus: Moores is "thoroughly vicious." Redell, 88 N.W. at 247 (Albert, J., concurring).
136. The Nebraska Supreme Court files confirm this. Id. (Norval, J., dissenting).
137. Herdman, supra note 93, at 232-33.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 233.
140. There is a tension in the text. See infra note 143.
141. Herdman, supra note 93, at 233.

142. Id. (citing People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 47 (1871) (Cooley, J., dissenting)).
143. For a discussion of Cooley's localism, see Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional
Vulnerability ofAmerican Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law,

1986 Wis. L. REv. 83, 145-49.
144. Herdman, supra note 93, at 233. For a discussion of the case in which Cooley
wrote, People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871), see Emily F. Hartigan, Law and Mystery:
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Two years later, Herdman rousts the illusory Redell, and
puts it up as a phantom epitaph for Moores under "IV. OVER145
RULED IN TOTO."'
Fifteen years after Moores the court has before it a new act
from 1915 that puts the Lincoln legislature in the business of
redistricting. In State ex rel.Harte v. Moorhead,14 6 the court not
only rehabilitated Moores but also used its rationale to add a
new dimension to the political rights retained by the people.
The Moores case, "overruled in toto," lives.
By the time of Harte in 1916, Herdman is gone, replaced by
Lindsay as reporter (we will return to Herdman later). The
Harte court discusses Moores but frames the discussion with a
broader temporal and doctrinal brush. It turns the issue
slightly; instead of talking of the lack of letter of the law, it talks
of the primacy of purpose over letter. While Cooley talked of
the validity of the unwritten, the Harte court suggests that
unwritten constitutional text may speak to the written constitutional text; that is, interpretation based on purpose can, by
implication, supply the "missing" letter, or overcome a "false"
letter. To do so, it reaches back to State ex rel Stull v. Bartley:147
The fact that a statute is within the letter of the Constitution is
not sufficient .... An act which violates the true meaning and
intent of the Constitution and is an evasion of its general
express or plainly implied purpose is as clearly void as if, in
express terms prohibited. State v. Bartley, 41 Neb. 277 (1894).
That this statement of law is substantially
correct has never
14 8
been controverted in this state.

This conclusion is upheld by a distinction that the Harte
court reads into Moores: "'the distinction . . . between [the

appointment of] officers whose duties are exclusively of a local
nature and officers appointed for a particular locality, but yet
whose duties are of a public or general nature.' "149

By passing

Moores (and Redell) as examples of a dispute over a kind of official, the Harte court says it is dealing not with officers but "with
counties and their government:"' 50 "County governments are
Calling the Letter to Life Through the Spirit of the Law of State Constitutions, 6 J.L. &
RELIGION 225, 240, 242-43, 255-56 (1988).

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Herdman, supra note 105, at xcii.
156 N.W. 1067 (Neb. 1915).
59 N.W. 907 (Neb. 1894).
Harte, 156 N.W. at 1068.
Id. at 1069 (quoting Burch v. Hardwick, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 22, 24 (1878)).
Id.
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local in their nature, and the Constitution protects them in their
right of local self-government." 15 ' We will have to pass fairly
quickly by the unmet issue: Redell supposedly stands for the
proposition that political bodies do not have rights,1 52 while
Harte expressly protects counties "in their right of local self-government."1 53 Unmet or not, Redell's target, Moores, moves back
into favor. The dissent tells us this conclusion is so.
Chief Justice Morrisey dissents because "no provision in
our Constitution has been pointed out to which the act does violence." 154 Morrissey explicitly aims his complaint at the resurrected Moores, stating that the Harte majority bases its decision
on the Moores doctrine "that an act might be unconstitutional as
being in violation of the spirit of the Constitution." 155 Redell,
Morrissey complains, set Moores aside.1 56 With the Moores
spirit roaming free, he opines, " 'the Constitution of the state is
to be fully known only by studying the theories of the judges
who are chosen to expound it.'

"1157

What Morrissey does that Sullivan (and even Herdman)
failed to do in Redell is to tie his version of the written-only
Constitution to the sovereignty of the people. Here he frames
the creative paradox fully:
"The Constitution of this state confers plenary legislative
power upon the general assembly; and, if an act is within the
legitimate exercise of that power, it is valid, unless some
express restriction or limitation can be found in the Constitution itself.
...This

doctrine is elementary, is cardinal, and arises out

of the very nature of our form of government. With us, sovereignty resides with the people. Were they acting as a whole for
themselves, there can be no doubt but this, or any other law
that should receive a majority sanction, would be conclusive.
But, parceling out the exercise of their sovereign power to the
three departments of government-the legislative, the executive, and the judicial-to the first has been committed, except
what has been abandoned to the congress of the United States,
the exercise of the whole sovereign law-making power as completely and absolutely as possessed by the people, subject only
151. Id.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 128-34.

153. Harte, 156 N.W. at 1069.
154. Id. at 1071 (Morrissey, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1073 (Morrissey, J., dissenting).

156. Id.
157. Id. (quoting State v. Kennedy, 83 N.W. 87, 88 (Neb. 1900)).
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to such limitations as the people may have chosen to impose.
These limitations are set out in the state Constitution."
The constitutional provision quoted in the majority opinion that "all powers not herein delegated are reserved to the
people," instead of being, as indicated by the opinion, a limitation upon the Legislature, is a positive affirmation that, unless
restrained by constitutional limitations, the people, acting
through their Legislature, are free to enact any law they deem
desirable.
Where no limitation is expressed in the Constitution:
"The framers of the Constitution relied for protection in
this regard upon the wisdom and justice of the representative
body and the accountability of its members to the people,
rather than the restraining power of the courts of law. It is said
that 'the courts can enforce only those limitations which the
Constitution imposes, and not those implied restrictions,
which, resting on theory only, the people have been satisfied to
leave to the judgment, patriotism, and sense of justice of their
representatives.' COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,
129."158

The key is the conflation of people and legislature. Now, rather
than equating people with government, the dissent equates the
people with only one branch of government, the legislature. The
dissent takes the final step in restricting government to the legislature by proposing the elimination of the judiciary from the
equation. The dissent must be claiming that because any notion
of what government really is belongs to the legislature only, the
judiciary has nothing to say about the powers reserved to the
people, or the guarantee of a republican form of governmentthe republican guarantee that grounds the majority's rationale
for equal voting power: "[T]he nature of a republican form of
government... is a political question, and is beyond the jurisdiction of the judiciary." 159 The problem with this is that the judiciary in Nebraska, created long after John Marshall's
unequivocal recognition of judicial review, was also set up by the
people to do what the Nebraska court and all American courts
have been doing and fighting about all along: bringing into
being the law as expressed in written texts, especially constitutions, in the name of the people.
The Harte majority not only cites article I, which states:
158. Id. at 1071 (Morrissey, J., dissenting) (quoting Hallenbeck v. Hahn, 2 Neb. 377
(1873)).
159. Id. at 1072 (Morrissey, J., dissenting).
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"'all persons are by nature free and independent' and have certain inherent and inalienable rights," 160 but also invokes the
reserved powers: "'all powers not herein delegated remain with
the people.' "161 "If all power rests in the first instance with the
people, and they delegate certain powers to certain of their representatives and retain all other powers, this distinguishes such a
government from a monarchy or oligarchy." 162 This chorus is
not new. What is new about Harte is its further expansion of the
text. The writing moves out another layer and the context
grows. In Moores, it was local government and Lincoln's
famous speech that expanded the text. 163 In Harte the text is
expanded by equal representative power' 14 and the great seal of
the state of Nebraska: "The principal of our Constitution of
absolute equality in governmental matters is recognized in the
legislation which requires that the great seal of the state shall
contain the words 'Equality before the Law.' "1165
The great seal is called to move from the context into the
text. The words "equality before the law" are not in Volume
two's "Constitution," but they are unavoidable, unwritten,
forebearers of that text:
When our forefathers emigrated from their European home, it
was in the main to escape from the oppression of inequality.
They brought with them a burning love for this great democratic principle, and imbedded it deep in the foundation of the
empire they were destined to erect, and which they will preserve so long as the love of liberty is more than a name. When
they threw off the supervising government of the mother country, it was because they were denied equality of representation;
or, as they then expressed the evil, they had imposed upon
them taxation without representation. Equality of representation is a vital principle of democracy. In proportion as this is
denied or withheld, the government becomes oligarchical or
monarchical. Without equality republican institutions are
impossible. Inequality of representation is a tyranny
to which
1 66
no people worthy of freedom will tamely submit.
In the same opinion the court said:
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 1069 (quoting NEB. CONsT. art. 1, § 1).
Id. (quoting NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 26).
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.

164. The U.S. courts later refer to "equal representation power" as one person, one
vote.
165. Harte, 156 N.W. at 1069.
166. Id. at 1070.
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It is not insisted that the equality of representation is to be
made mathematically exact. This is manifestly impossible. All
that the Constitution requires is that equality in the representation of the state which an ordinary knowledge of its population
and a sense of common justice would suggest.
...

It was never contemplated that one elector should pos-

sess two or three times more influence, in the person of a representative or senator, than another elector in another district.
Each, in so far as it is practicable, is, under the Constitution,
possessed of equal power and influence. Equality
in such mat167
ters lies at the basis of our free government.
Herdman decries dicta sine cera-words not under seal. The
Moores-Harte doctrine is now under seal.
VII.

BACK TO THE REPORTER, HERDMAN

The unwritten constitution, the theory of the power of the people cited in the original annotation under section 26-that powers other than those specified in the bill of rights were retained
by the people-was resurrected in the Harte case. But was
Harte a late announcement of something much closer in time to
the overruling in toto of Moores? The reporter Herdman made
the pronouncement of Moores's demise in volume 65 of the
Nebraska Reports.168 As of volume 64 of the Nebraska Reports,
however, Moores, or at least Moores in facta, was alive and
well. 169 It took fourteen years and some unspoken channel for
the news to reach the written text overtly, but the Moores decision, which Herdman pronounces dead on page lxxviii of volume
65 of the Nebraska Reports, was found, after having never been
missing in action, on page 701 of the prior volume. The finder
is, of all people, Justice Sullivan. The plot thickens.
The Redell case did at least two things: it "overruled"
Moores and all ghosts of unwritten constitutions, 170 and it rehabilitated the governor's power to appoint a fire and police commission for Omaha. 1 7 1 However, we find in State v. Savage 172
that Ezra Savage, the governor of Nebraska in 1902, refused to
exercise that reinvested appointment power. The key to Redell
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. (citing Ragland v. Anderson, 100 S.W. 865, 869 (Ky. 1907)).
Herdman, supra note 105, at xcii.
Lee Herdman, Reporter'sNotes to 64 NEBRASKA REPORTS 701 (1902).
Redell v. Moores, 88 N.W. 243, 247 (Neb. 1901).
Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 108-34.
90 N.W. 898 (Neb. 1902).
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by its own account, the governor's power created by the all powerful legislature (to which the court defers), remained unexercised. Now where is the legislature, that repository, according
to Redell (via Sullivan), of all sovereign power? It is helpless in
the face of the judiciary's refusal to act. The people passed the
law, their court returned to them their powerful statute, and the
governor balked. The court is powerless (before rehearing-but
I am getting ahead of the story again) to guard the absolute sovereignty of the people in the face of a recalcitrant executive.
Finally, on reconsideration, the court says to the governor that
the law requires him to173
appoint, but the court declines to issue
mandamus to that end.
How does Moores, personally and in his namesake case,
prevail in this volume before being overruled in toto? Sullivan
gives two reasons for this outcome. The first reason is an outburst in mid-discussion that "[a]ll judicial controversies must
end some time and this one seems to have run its course." 174
The other reason is revealed by a construction of what the court
had done with, and said about, facta and dicta. Sullivan takes
recourse in the solely political reality, stepping completely
outside the line of judicial authority. He concludes that the
political fight, the attempt of the state to oust the board of fire
and police commissioners in Omaha, "has been once tried and
determined, and, under existing conditions, the judgment ren'
dered is an effective bar to another suit for the same purpose." 175
Why is the judgment, the decision in Moores, an effective bar,
given that Moores was overruled?
The right of the mayor's appointees to hold the offices was the
thing adjudged in State v. Moores, and it is the only thing to be
adjudged in this action. The decision in the Moores Case is not
law, but for the purposes of this litigation it stands in the place
of the law. The governor may, of course, appoint, but in the
face of a plea of resjudicata we can not put his appointees in
possession 176
of the offices. The court is held in bondage by its
own error.

Sullivan concludes that "Statpro ratione voluntas is the rule of
decision in this case." 177 This rule, according to Black's Law
Dictionary, means that "the will stands in the place of rea-

l73.

Id.

174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 899.
Id. at 901.
Id (emphasis added).
Id.
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son."'7 8 The next entry in Black's is state pro ratione voluntas
1 79
populi, "the will of the people stands in the place of reason.'
If it is not the people's will that prevails, whose will is it? The
court and the governor who seem to lack a will? The political
endurance of the people of Omaha? Or the will of the people,
the local people whom the court has tried to strip of the protection of law and have been driven outside "the law" and yet abide
with Moores, which, Sullivan states, "stands in the place of
law."' 180 The court feels "held in bondage by" Moores:' 8'
Moores governs, and local government is alive.
For reporter Herdman, this judicial capitulation to reality is
more than he can bear. His Reporter'sNotes to Savage go on for
pages. 8 2 He cites case after case after case from Nebraska, disseminating precedents wildly, trying to continue the role the
court has abandoned, the continuation of the old written law in
the face of the patient, surviving Moores.183 But it isn't over
until the fat lady sings, and it also isn't over until the reporter
84
gives up.
Who is this Herdman who hangs on, after Sullivan who had
thought he had triumphed over the vicious Moores, surrenders?
What is he so desperately attached to, that he continues to note
and annotate after the justices have gone home? In what cause
are his efforts? One hint comes in the rehearing in State v. Savage.' 85 Sedgwick tries his hand at explaining why Moores
prevails. He begins by saying that the Moores and Redell question was the location of the legal power of appointment, the governor or the mayor, but immediately asks "was that the thing
(res) in litigation, the substantive matter that the respective parties were contending for?"' 18 6 The alternative he offers for dis87
cussion is that the thing at issue was a proposition of law.
Sedgwick says that what the attorneys argued about, what the
178. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (6th ed. 1990).
179. Id

180. Savage, 90 N.W. at 901.
181. Id.
182. Herdman, supra note 169, at 706-10.
183. See id. at 707-10. Very soon after Savage, Governor Savage, in turn, capitulated
to politics and did appoint a board. See SOUTH OMAHA TIMES, Aug. 5, 1902, at 2. It was
the court challenge to Savage's board which elicited the postponement of authorities noted
above. See supra note 134.
184. Nor is it over while authority is postponed-but that is another story.
185. 91 N.W. 557 (Neb. 1902).
186. Id at 558.
187. Id
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court discussed and what the court decided, was the legal question-but the real subject of the litigation could not have been
the law, because "[a]bstract questions of law cannot be made the
subject of litigation."188 He concludes that in the Moores case,
the thing in dispute was the office itself.18 9
Sedgwick has done what Redell did. He has left the text.
The entire controversy was not what counsel argued or the court
decided, but the "substantive" (his word) controversy, in the
offices then and there. 190 He attempts to heal this substance/
law/fact split by another distinction between res judicata and
stare decisis, but that only rehabilitates the theory of Moores,
because only misapplication of legal theory can split the theory
and the fact so that the "bottom line" comes out as Sedgwick
hopes. Like Derrida's pharmakon, the medicine intended to
heal that may poison,1 91 Sullivan and Sedgwick's "theory" poisons their own enterprise. Their instrument of death for Moores
has not only resurrected the body-the commissioners still sit as
Moores sat them-but by implication, also the spirit, if Sedgwick
is right that the rule of law exists but was wrongly applied.
Those of the anti-Moores group have tangled their own lines
hopelessly. Herdman is still casting about, however.
At this point, in writing this very text, I was sitting in my
office, having reviewed Lee Herdman's Reporter's Notes for all
the volumes he reported and edited, mulling over the section
that was to begin: "Who was Herdman, anyway?" My first
readings had shown a learned but redundant, literal man, almost
compulsively attached to the letter. Yet another theme ran
through my rereading of his notes. He began to betray flexibility. He became more verbose but more ambivalent. He seemed
to have two sides. My research assistant called. I had asked her
to find a picture of Herdman, had told her that I thought Herdman was somehow the main character in this story, and that it
was becoming a mystery story, complete with the murder and
the misplaced body. She told me there were two obituary pictures for Herdman: one, she said, was grim, and the other
benign.
But the best part was what he did when he left his post as
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Does it matter that in volume 64 we find, as in volumes 61 through 65, that one
of the court commissioners is Roscoe Pound?
191. See DERRIDA, supra note 32, at 71-72.
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reporter. Herdman stepped out of the text into the real 192
story.
He became a police commissioner for the city of Omaha.
We still don't know who appointed him, 193 but we do know
that he had an extensive library, was allegedly once William Jen94
nings Bryan's secretary, and often talked with Roscoe Pound.
At the birth of legal realism, Herdman did what Pound talked
about: he was facta to Pound's dicta. Somehow, however, I
think he struggled with his ambivalence between letter and spirit
until the end, as we all must. The obituary tells us that he was
divorced some years before his death in 1936 at age 71, but his
wife had two years before his death returned from California,
and taken up residence with their daughter in the same Blackstone Hotel in which Lee Herdman died.195
What do his texts, written as reporter, tell us? I must warn
you: in the phone call, my assistant told me that his name was
Robert E. Lee Herdman. 196 He, who was fully in charge of
"every jot and tittle" of the reporter volumes, always names
himself simply Lee Herdman (an unassumed name). Does his
name tell us he was a shepherd (a sovereign), a herd member, or
both?197 I suspect we will learn about him from his texts and,
perhaps, from old newspapers, but, in the end, we may have
found only the body. 198 I feel as if the error in the first section 26
annotation was Lee Herdman's epitaph, and he has no grave to
visit. Do I want to advocate erasing what is written for Herdman on his gravestone, or is this Article a better trace of him? 199
Who was Robert E. Lee Herdman?
He begins his text as reporter with a fierce dedication that
invites good-natured laughter: "The present rule is to follow
quotations from records, reports and text-books verbatim et literatim et punctim with the verity of a Chinese copyist. ' ' 2°° By
volume 60, his introductory notes tell us not only that he
192. Herdman Dies at 71, OMAHA MORNING BEE, June 16, 1936, at 3; Lee Herdman

Dies in Omaha Hospital, EVENING STATE J.,June 15, 1936, at 1.
193. Even this becomes ambiguous, as the yearly listings of such officers in the
Omaha City Directory for the years 1900 to 1907 do not list Herdman.
194. See Lee Herdman, Reporter'sNotes to 62 NEBRASKA REPORTS at viii (1901).
195. Herdman Dies at 71, supra note 192, at 3.
196. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
197. He is listed in the Omaha City Directory of 1893 underfour different combinations of names and initials; he is dissimulating from the start.
198. We will not have found even that-the obituary tells us he was cremated. Herdman Dies at 71, supra note 192, at 3.
199. "Trace," "ashes," and "fife/death," are all key motifs in Derrida's work.
200. Lee Herdman, Reporter'sNotes to 59 NEBRASKA REPORTS at viii (1899-1900).
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includes a list "believed to be complete" of every Nebraska decision bearing on mechanics' liens, but also that "under protest"20 1
he has used a caption for appellate cases because "Man yields to
custom as he bows to fate." 202 Herdman the "true" [sic] (the
literal), begins to bend. However, Herdman the literal is sometimes pretentious; he is, in his self-introduction, both Latin and
Chinese in the same sentence. His Latin is, unfortunately, not
only untranslated but also not as it seems. The dicta sine cera
we saw above in his dismissal of Dred Scott and Taney 20 3 means
"things said without wax." In legal phraseology, dicta means
things said by the way, opinions that do not "embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument
or full consideration of the point.' '20 4 But there is no entry in
Black's for dicta sine cera. Indeed, there is not entry for that
phrase or sine cera in any of the major lexicons of legal maxirs.25 Cera is, in old English law, wax or a seal. The great seal
was one "by virtue of which a great part of the royal authority is
exercised." 2 °6 "Seal" comes from the Latin for sign.20 7 Yet
Herdman, so willing to dismiss all Taney wrote except his jurisdiction-destroying sentence, counts Redell, "made without argument or full consideration of the point" 208 and later conceded to
have been about nothing but who was on the police and fire commissions, as overruling Moores in toto.20 9 He is going to be
pointed word by word and by the letter, but we shall see that his
letters and his signs, seeming so strict, are actually at sea.
In volumes prior to Herdman's advent, there had been a list
of cases overruled. 210 Herdman notes this fact in volume 60 and
again in volume 61,211 and adds that "[t]he listing of cases con201. Lee Herdman, Reporter's Notes to 60 NEBRASKA REPORTS at viii (1900).

202. Id
203. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
204. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (6th ed. 1990).
205.

For the omission, see CASSELL'S LATIN-ENGLISH AND ENGLISH-LATIN DIC-

TIONARY (26th ed. 1953); CYCLOPEDIC LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1940); WILLIAM F.
FOSTER, LATIN MAXIMS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1924); FRED C. MULLINIX, LEGAL
PHILOLOGY: EPIGRAMS AND EXCERPTS FROM THE LEGAL OPINIONS OF THE HONORABLE HENRY LAMM (1923); OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1982); LATIN WORDS
AND PHRASES FOR LAWYERS (1980); S.S. PELOUBET, A COLLECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS
IN LAW AND EQUITY (Rothman & Co. ed., 1985) (1884).

206. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1701 (6th ed. 1990).
207. THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 426 (1986).

208.
209.
210.
211.

See supra text accompanying notes 96-106.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Reporter'sNotes to 52 NEBRASKA REPORTS (1895).
See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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taining apparently conflicting dicta would subserve no useful
purpose," a cryptic and redundant statement.212 In volume 62,
he is warming to the task. He notes that a total revision of the
list of overruled cases is underway, but it was a job of unanticipated magnitude.21 3 He decides that:
Even where the case of A v. B is in apparent conflict with the
case of C v. D; and in the subsequent case of E v. F, the writer
of the opinion does not in ha/ec verba [in those words] overrule
A v. B, but says that it is overruled by C v. D, A v. B should
not, except in an extreme instance, be placed in the list of cases
overruled.214
When in the next volume, volume 63, Herdman begins his
detailed discussion of obiter dicta,2 15 he uses the notions offacta

and dicta noted above. He says that in his work, "what the
court does and not what it says in the doing" 216 determines
whether or not the former opinion is overruled. This seems in
direct tension with what he said last volume-that only overruling in ha/ec verba counts-that is, overruling "in those words."
If the court does not use the magic words, volume 62 says, Herdman will not count a case as overruled (so scrupulous). He goes
by the literal, the very letter and word, he insists in volume 59.217
But in volume 63 he will watch what the court does and not
what it says in the doing. He stoutly maintains that "[c]ases
containing dicta in apparent conflict, where the facta are not
antagonistic, will not be placed in the family of overruled
cases." 218 You have to have a real fight, the very same fight, to
get into this family of overruled cases.
This is not the only time Herdman overrules himself. In
volume 63, he tells us that he has used Dred Scott and other
federal cases (rather than Nebraska cases) as "[i]llustrations...
because such discussion [of the cases in his own jurisdiction] by
an editor is ultra provincium," outside his official duties. 2 19 To

comment on Nebraska cases would be outside his legal boundaries. Yet by his exit in volume 66, Herdman contradicts himself,
goes against his own words. He ends his last reporter's notes
212. Herdman, supra note 201, at viii.

213. Herdman, supra note 194, at viii.
214. Id.
215. Herdman, supra note 93, at vii.
216. Id.

217. See supra note 200.
218. Herdman, supra note 93, at vii.
219. Id.
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saying that an opinion by Sullivan in an earlier volume (one of
his own) is mere dicta.220 For his finale, this punctilious reporter
reaches out from the text (volume 66) two books back to volume
64, and says that the engineer of Redell, Sullivan, refused to
221
issue a writ, but that all he said in so doing was nothing.
Herdman does what he says in volume 63 is unacceptable for
him-he sets his aim on his own court instead of on Taney and
the federal court. I suggest that it is in volume 65 that Herdman
loses track of himself, becomes deconstructed, and begins to
move from the text into the story-by volume 66 he is already in
the story.
Volume 65 contains Moores's obituary.222 The word of
Moores's death appears in the only listing of the increasingly
fancy section on cases overruled, now called the "Digest of
Nebraska Cases Overruled, Modified, Distinguished, Negatived
and to Be Compared," that still has Roman numerals.223 Imperial Latin has triumphed again, and "IV. OVERRULED IN
TOTO" sits above Moores.224 Meanwhile, in the Reporter's
Notes to volume 65, Herdman's flexible side, the one that bent to
custom, has given way completely.
Grammar is simply the fashion of writing and speaking. A
man who violates a syntactical rule, is guilty of the same kind
of an offense as one who would appear at a four-hundred ball in
corduroy pantaloons .... The truth is that men do not write
and speak by logic, but in accord with fashion. The verdant
editor of a book is sophomorical in his criticisms. But experience is the parent of wisdom; and, in time, the editor will settle
down to the rule of preserving, as far as possible, the idiosyncrasy of the author .... 225
He celebrates Americanisms, praises the diversity among Greek
dialects, and revels in plurality. A volume before, he augmented
and "noted" Savage as saying Redell came to naught and
Moores had triumphed in reality; next volume he will exit the
text to enter the reality undergirding it; yet in this volume, in his
most prolix table of cases, he lets Roman numerals and dictato220. Lee Herdman, Reporter'sNotes to 66 NEBRASKA REPORTS (1903).
221. Id. at x.
222. See Lee Herdman, Digest of Nebraska Cases Overruled,Modified, Distinguished,
Negatived and to Be Compared for 65 NEBRASKA REPORTS (1902). Obituary is from obitus
death, going down-obiter dicta, words going down, going to death, dead words.
223. Id. at lxxxix, xlii.
224. Id.
225. Herdman, supra note 105 at xxxviii.
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rial distinctions "overrule" Moores not only in toto, but also,
perhaps, in perpetuity.
Why would Herdman take his leave so harshly, so careless
of his use of words, calling Sullivan's writing dead words? There
was one other strong "loose end" floating in my mind: why did
every version of Herdman's new improved "Cases Overruled"
begin with some set of notes dealing with whether murder while
robbing, lacking intent to kill, was first degree? 226 As it was evening, and my research assistant would not arrive with the pictures and background on Herdman until at least the next day, I
looked at the case to which Herdman referred. As he had said
in his farewell salvo, there were extensive notes following Sullivan's opinion in In re William Rhea.227 The notes began: "William Rhea was executed at the state penitentiary at 1:22 p.m.,
July 10, 1903. " 228 Rhea was convicted of murder without specific intent to kill while committing a saloon robbery at the age
of eighteen. Here were two dead bodies, by anyone's version of
reality.
Was Herdman's note an outburst at Sullivan Rhea's epitaph
as well as a cry of new wisdom? "There is meaning testified to
in interjections and outcries, before being disclosed in propositions .... ,
Were his words alive, not dead, when he subsequently acted as police commissioner? What did he think of
words then, after his experience with Sullivan's refusal to grant a
writing, a writ, to stay Rhea's execution? It seems that he saw
taking care with words, making words count, writing carefully,
very differently than he had as a "verdant" Chinese copyist.
And thus Herdman did write, if intemperately, true words: Sullivan's words were empty of meaning and yet full of death.23 °
A final expansion remains to be taken from out of the texts
and the encirclement of texts: the historical context. But we
have broken through to the final edges of that text with the execution of William Rhea. In law, what philosophers call a
"performative utterance" can be lethal.231
226. See Herdman, supra note 222, at 7xxxix.
227. See Herdman, supra note 169, at 887-89.
228. Id. at 887.
229.

EMMANUEL LEVINAS, COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 172 (Alphonso

Lingis trans., 1987).
230. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1622 (1986).
231. See id.
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THE NEXT DAY

I feel as if I were in a Gabriel Garcia Marquez novel or in
Alice Walker's The Temple of My Familiar2a2--my research
assistant today provided the two pictures of Herdman and something she had found. She announced that one of the police and
fire commissioners whom the Moores case unseated was Herdman himself.
Neither of us had recognized him before, sitting there in the
text, in plain view, on page 488 of volume 55. When we had
read the case, we had not known the name of the reporter of
later volumes. And until she got the obituaries, the words of
Herdman's death, we did not know that "R.E.L. Herdman" of
volume 55 was "Lee Herdman" of volumes 59 through 66. This
name, in its various disguises, is the purloined letter: sitting in
plain sight in the text, revealing the substance of the case. It was
Sullivan in Savage who said that the substance233 was who sat on
the commission.234 Appointed by the governor back in 1898,
Herdman did not get his seat back until 1904-when, the obituaries tell us, he left the job of reporter to take a seat on the Omaha
police commission.

2 35

I suggested there would be surprises, but this is beyond a
story I could have conceived. I am tempted to include affidavits:
the story as I am telling it to you is how it came to us. Now I
understand why Derrida says things in his text like "I am sitting
here at my typewriter and I raise my hand and swear. "236 I did
not mess with this text; this story has unfolded itself. Herdman,
by whatever first names he chooses, was totally unknown to me.
Now he illustrates what the literature about critical and psychoanalytic theory is talking about, the purloined letter, the detective story that turns on a letter hidden in plain sight.237 The text
is playing with us. It is strange and wonderful and sad. William
Rhea was executed at 1:22 p.m. on July 10, 1903, despite Herdman's frantic annotations 238 and Sedgwick's dissent on
232. ALICE WALKER, THE TEMPLE OF MY FAMILIAR (1989).

233. For an accessible discussion of the contemporary "fear of substance," see generally WILLIAM BARRETT, THE DEATH OF THE SOUL (1986).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 185-89.
235. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 28 (for a sampling of works).
237. See DERRIDA, supra note 32, at 442-43; see also STANLEY CAVELL, IN QUEST
OF THE ORDINARY 160-68 (1988); Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 644, 663-64 (1990).
238. See Herdman, supra note 169, at 887-89; supra text accompanying notes 226-31.
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Sedgwick decried a jury instruction in Rhea's case -a
saloon robbery, in which one of the card-players, the proprietor,
supposedly rose from the table and was shot (but that is another
story).241 The instruction said that even an accidental killing
committed in the process of a robbery was first degree murder.242
Sedgwick cited the move away from severity, that crimes are not
prevented by too severe penalties, that "[s]ome of the states have
refused to legalize the taking of human life as a punishment for244a
crime."243 He called for a "more humane" use of sanctions.

Herdman had already piled on two and a half pages of
annotations.
In the Savage case, Sullivan gave in to the will of the local
people, finally, over the letter of the law that he had earlier propounded. In the Rhea case, he did not give up the letter, instead
making it into a death sentence, 245 and two volumes later, Robert E. Lee Herdman pronounced Sullivan's letter dead, obiter
dicta, and left our text for the world of the Omaha police commission.246 We will follow the story long enough to give the
next-to-last expansion of the context of the annotation to section
26 in volume 2 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska.247 But we

have found a switch point in Lee Herdman. The text turns on
him, and in following the clue he left us-the "wrong" annotation-we have found the bodies (Rhea shot Herman Zahn). But
who did it? Who is the killer of letter and spirit? Who makes
the letter dead? Is it the letter alone that kills, as Paul seems to
say in the Greek scriptures 248 along with Abraham Joshua Heschel in rabbinic Judaism, 249 or is it the dead letter that kills?
239. Rhea v. State, 64 Neb. 885 app. at 889 (1903) (Sedgwick, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion to Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 641 (1902)).

240. See id. at 889-90 (Sedgwick, J.,dissenting).
241. See DERRIDA, supra note 32, at 501 (Sedgwick, J., dissenting).
242. Rhea, 64 Neb. at 889-90 (Sedgwick, J.,dissenting).

243. Id. at 890 (Sedgwick, J., dissenting).
244. Id.
245. Derrida plays on the French version of "death sentence." L'arrite de mort
becomes "both death sentence and reprive from death." See, eg., DERRIDA, supra note 32,
at 9; DERRIDA, supra note 2, at 285-6. This idea was addressed most seriously in a text
delivered by Derrida at the Nebraska Union. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: "The Mystical" Foundation of Authority, Address at the Nebraska Union (Apr. 19, 1990) (transcript

available from author).
246. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
248. See I Corinthians.
249. See, eg., ROGER BROOKS, THE SPIRIT OF THE TEN COMMANDMENTS (1990);
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Can we live without killing, or is killing, which Sedgwick wanted
to minimize in the law, a lingering, inevitable, and tragic, if progressively gentler, aspect of life? Sedgwick notes:
If no purpose to kill is necessary to constitute murder, where
the killing is brought about by administering poison, then the
most innocent act of one's life may turn out to be a murder
....

[A] man [would then be] a murderer, who innocently

administers what he supposes to be a proper dose of medicine,
but which turns out to be a poison which kills ....
025
Yet, is this not what we do in life, innocently doing the best we
can, while often poisoning by mistake? That is what Derrida
works with in Plato'sPharmacy-thepharmakon,that which is
medicine yet can also poison. 251 If we do harm only in ignorance, as Plato says,25 2 then what cures and what kills are indistinguishable, and yet, Derrida insists, not unchoosable. 5 3 We
always have a choice. In the face of death, we can choose life.

IX.

THE DAY AFTER THAT

After writing the sentence before this one, I went home.
There was a message on my answering machine: I had asked my
research assistant, two weeks ago, to find out what the two political factions were, who fought in court and in reality over the
police commission. Yesterday, she sifted through the newspaper
archives-one faction was the Omaha people who had been
functioning as police and fire commissioners before the legislation that set Herdman and others on the commission and precipitated Moores. The other faction behind the Moores case the
newspaper called "the Herdman gang."
Before I listened to the phone message, I began to reread
Plato'sPharmacy, as I had been operating purely from memory,
not having read it since April, shortly after Derrida left. One of
his points, I recalled, had to do with how much there was in the
text that we do not see at first. Like "R.E.L. Herdman" at the
beginning of Moores.
ABRAHAM J. HESCHEL, MAN'S QUEST FOR GOD: STUDIES IN PRAYER AND SYMBOLISM
(1954); E.P. SANDERS, PAUL AND PALESTINIAN JUDAISM (1977); EDITH WYSCHOGORAD,

(1990).
250. Rhea v. State, 64 Neb. 885 app. at 891 (1903) (Sedgwick, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion to Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 641 (1902)) (quoting Bechtelleimer v. State, 54 Ind.
128, 136 (1876)).
251. Derrida, Plato's Pharmacy,supra note 28, at 71-72, 95.
252. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
253. Derrida, Plato'sPharmacy, supra note 28, at 95.
CROSS CURRENTS
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A text is not a text unless it hides from the first comer, from the
first glance, the law of its composition and the rules of its game.
A text remains, moreover, forever imperceptible. Its laws and
its rules are not, however, harbored in the inaccessibility of a
secret; it is simply that they can never be booked, in the present, into anything that could rigorously be called a
perception.25 4
The text, he suggests, is a web, making and unmaking for centuries (here, just about one century), and when we touch it, we risk
getting a few fingers caught in the reweaving, and the addition of
2 5
some new thready.
To do this, we must have the "ability to
follow a given thread [t]hat is, if you follow me, the hidden
thread. '256 It seems that one hidden thread is the line of signatures of Lee Herdman.
X. THE THIRD DAY, TURNING AROUND
In Derrida's texts, there is a fundamental movement of
turning. He puts the center of Plato's Phadreus257 and its questions of writing, at the "precise calculated center" of the dialogue-by counting the lines in the dialogue."' He is right that
the central name ("speechwriter") is written "in the heart" of
the dialogue, if what is being examined is the thread of speech/
writing, or speech/writing. The center of our story is Lee Herdman's overruling in toto, which is really an overturning in Toto,
too much turning, whirling in the All-it gets going around too
fast, and the reader gets dizzy. This is true of Derrida's texts
and of this story. The end of Plato's Pharmacy is just such a
dizzying reversal after reversal, a whirling into dervishhood, like
the game we played as children, spinning in circles until we lost
our equilibrium and fell down-and felt the earth moving with
and beneath us. We did it for fun. In the best sense of play,
Derrida does it for play. 259 When we lose our normal equilibrium, we "feel" a reality that we in our ordinary body orienta254. Id. at 63.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. PLATO, Phadreus (R. Hackforth trans.), in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF
PLATO 475 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1985).
258. Derrida, Plato'sPharmacy, supra note 28, at 68.
259. On "the best sense of play," see DERRIDA, supra note 32, at 156. Frank
Kermode comments on Derrida that "[i]t's not a walk through a subject, it's a dance on a
subject. He's always picking up the last phrase he used and looking at it and sort of doing a
little dance around it, and yet it's a deeply serious performance." FRANK KERMODE,
POETRY, NARRATIVE, HISTORY 81 (1990).
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tion cannot feel-that the earth moves. In this story, I said I
hoped we would have fun, but the spinning has come to its apex
and it is time to wind down. We have discovered the bodies, the
perpetrator, and the Herdman gang, but we do not know how
fully indeterminate (not undecidable, at least for the moment?)
the story is. This knowledge would come with research, the
third key day.
It started with trying to locate the annotation itself. Why
does the present revised statutes volume, volume two, contain
two "versions" of Moores? As I searched for that thread,
through the library shelves, my research assistant was there,
with her unrecorded, unorganized but experienced range of
information gleaned from supreme court files, old briefs, and
newspapers. The conversation and the books wove in and out.
She said that most of the papers for Moores were in another
court case file; Lee Herdman had left a note in the Moores file
saying the rest of the materials were in the Kennedy file.2 ° The
Kennedy case was controversial because Holcomb was a sitting
justice, yet he had been the appointing governor two years
before, and there were the allegations he should not sit on the
case with his own appointments at issue.26 1
The Kennedy court, per Sullivan, noted that the respondent's brief suggesting any impropriety or partisan bias by any
justice was so offensive that the brief would be stricken from the
file.262 There is a brief alleging such impropriety, there, perhaps,
thanks to Herdman, but we do not know if it is the brief allegedly stricken from the file or another, chastened version.263
Still, the flap over partisan bias led us to another case, State
v. Rosewater,264 and then the circle closed for a moment. The
case, related to Kennedy, was a case by the state against the editor of the Omaha Daily Bee, the paper from which my assistant
had been getting most of her history, including one of Herdman's obituaries. Edward Rosewater, the editor, had challenged
the court in his editorials, so the state sued him for charging the
court with partisan bias.265 Our final layer of context, the histor260. State v. Kennedy, 83 N.W. 87 (1900).
261. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
262. Kennedy, 83 N.W. at 90.
263. Respondent's Brief, State v. Kennedy, 83 N.W. 87 (1900) (No. 11, 226). The

brief, dated April 16 and date-stamped April 17, which predates the order to excise, seems
to be the original.
264. 83 N.W. 353 (Neb. 1900).
265. Id.
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ical layer, was contaminated. Holcomb himself held Rosewater
in contempt. 66 The very texture of the news reports was not
only political in the ordinary sense-it had also been drawn right
into the court. There in Lee Herdman's volume 60 was the fight
among text, subtext, and context. The fight gets so complicated
that it is unbalancing, but in the end, it may be decidable (for the
moment) by you, the reader. I hope not to leave this story such
that the final level of evidence, the day by day newspaper
accounts, is itself so untrustworthy that the historical tale unravels, that the "indeterminacy" of the text means that there is no
truth. It is just that you will have to make part of that decision.
Because after following the thread from the Kennedy case and
the thread from the annotation, I literally turned around in the
stacks of the library of the Nebraska College of Law and saw at
eye level something I could never have seen before: I saw on the
spine of a book "Nebraska Reports, Herdman," and "1." What
I saw was a set of unofficial reports, "shadow volumes," published for only five volumes. This supplementary reporting system was started by Lee Herdman. The volumes contain the
cases not officially reported, without syllabi by the justices, and
perhaps without much legal authority. 67 In the short-lived supplementary volumes there is the story of a little person caught
up in the great, visible, protracted struggle over the Omaha
police and fire commission. It is the story of W.W. Cox, 2 68 and
it is his story that I will give you to decide; the whole case may
hinge on it.
XI.

THE ANNOTATION ITSELF

In the meanwhile, I should give you the history of the original
Revised Statutes volume two annotations, because they turn in
much the same place as does Moores-somewhere in the
unknown life of "the reporter." Somewhere in the time period
between 1948 and 1956 Moores was overruled by the predecessors of volume two, the Revised Statutes. We cannot tell why
from the text. Perhaps it is there, and I overlooked it. During
that eight-year period, apparently the only time in the history of
the reporting of Nebraska statutes and cases, the same person,
Walter James, was both Reporter for the official reports, and
Revisor of Statutes. Prior to James's double tenure the 1943
266. Id. at 354.
267. Herdman says the propositions of law are not the responsibility of the justices.
268. See Moores v. State, 4 Herd. 235 (Neb. 1903).
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Revised Statutes had, in volume two, under section 26 of the
state constitution, listed State v. Moores without any mention of
its being "overruled." In 1948, the reissue of the 1943 Revised
Statutes was the same. In 1956, the reissue of 1943269 listed
Moores as overruled under section 26 for the first time.
Meanwhile, under section one, Moores was still intact in
1956, as it is today.27 It first appeared under section one, without notice, in 1929. However, in 1903, before Harte and after
Redell, Cobbey's Annotated Statutes of Nebraska lists Moores
under section 26, and not at all under section one.2 71 Appar-

ently, Cobbey considered Moores good law after Redell,27 2 as did
the subsequent revisors of statutes until Walter James. Only in
1929, for no apparent reason, did the 1929 Compiled Statutes of
Nebraska put an (unoverruled) annotation to Moores under section one, where it has remained.273 The next year, the Nebraska
court cited Moores-for the exact opposite of its actual holding-in Elmen v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment.274
Five years later, the two cases, Moores and Redell, surfaced in
another case, State ex rel Taylor v. Hall,275 but the court dodged
their confrontation.276 In Hall, the court recited the rationale of
Redell, which ties together sections: "[The justices] are not
required to divest themselves of all knowledge save that to be
gleaned from the act alone. For, were it possible for them thus
to divest themselves, the act would be unintelligible-a jumble of
words without meaning. "277 This is the common wisdom from
Redell itself27 8 : all words need context. Yet we are learning that

expanding the context can seem to produce a bigger jumble of
meaningless words.
The jumble is apparent on the "face" of the case-level context, the reporters. The next citation to Moores is in Sandberg v.
State.279 The court once again cites Moores for its unmistakable
269. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

COBBEY'S ANNOTATED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA § 26 annot. (1903).
Id.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
231 N.W. 772 (Neb. 1930).
262 N.W. 835, 847-48 (Neb. 1935).
Yet the court said that because the invalid section of a statute was severable in

the case at hand, they were not called to determine the effect of Moores on the entire act.
Moores must not have been dead for them.
277. Hall, 262 N.W. at 848.
278. See Redell v. Moores, 88 N.W. 243, - (1901).
279. 196 N.W. 501 (1972).
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opposite: "It is within [the legislature's]
power to legislate upon
' 280
any subject not therein prohibited.
Why this confusion? One reason may be that Derrida is
right: if the world is reversed, it comes to almost the same thing,
but not the same.281 If the people have the power, and the people speak, then the constitution should not stop them. But is the
legislature the people? The constitution says no. But what is the
"constitution" to say that the people (written "legislature") can
be stopped? Why this continual equation, sotto voce, of the people and the legislature? One reason is that the judiciary is less
obviously democratic. 282 But I think the history goes further
back.
Much of the most eloquent talk of the power of the legislature stems from the seventeenth century and people like Sir
Edward Coke.28 3 His description of the people in deliberative
assembly is powerful. But we must remember his context: his
legislature was Parliament, and it stood against the sovereignthe king.28 4 The tyrannical sovereign was in reality the authoritarian monarch, in Coke's time. We seem to have forgotten that
the people are an entirely different adversary/friend for a legislature than a legislature is for a monarch. All the early English
rhetoric about the representatives of the people must be put in
the much larger, older context. Thus what we fear, and what we
stand to lose, are very different than what our English
forebearers faced. If we revolt against our sovereign, we revolt
against ourselves.
XII.

SOVEREIGNS AND KINGS

How did we lose track of our fight to be the people? One
280. Id. at 504 (citation omitted).
281. This addresses the notions of repetition, reiteration and their psychological
counterparts, repetition compulsion and inheritance. See DERRIDA, supra note 2, at 202.
282. But see Kenneth Karst, Equality and Community: Lessons from the Civil Rights
Era, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 207 (1980) ("[C]ourts mainly represent our communitarian side, while our legislatures mainly serve as brokerage houses for individualistic
exchange.").
283. A thumbnail sketch of Coke's fight with the sovereign, one that includes his
valuation of the judiciary, not solely the legislature, is in Don Herzog, As Many as Six
Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 609, 624-27 (1987).
284. See A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA
AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 130 (1968); CHARLES H. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 130-31 (1947); see also Carol Rose, The Ancient
Constitution vs. the FederalistEmpire: Anti-Federalismfrom the Attack on "Monarchism"
to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 74, 80-81 (1989).
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reason is that we fought a war that we labeled a revolution, but
which was at once a war of colonial liberation and leaving home,
never to return. Contemporary psychological literature talks
about the law of the father, the system that we seek to grow
beyond.285 Our father in 1776 was George III; the Declaration
of Independence talks to him and to the world in which he
remains King of England. But rather than the Freudian primal
scene in which the sons kill the father and then set up laws so
that it will never happen again,286 we just left. We have never
resolved our Oedipal dilemma. Unlike the French, we did not
28 7
kill our king; unlike England, we did not keep our king.
Where is our sovereign?
We tried to revert, but the father of our country, George
(another George) 288 refused the crown when we pressed it on
him. We left home and then broke our ties with the help of the
regicide nation, France. We are confused about who the opponent is. In England, it was the tyranny of the monarch.289 In
America, we have no such overt hierarchy, but we remain confused about who we are, when we are in power, and where.29°
Political theorist Louis Hartz brought this dilemma to consciousness in 1955 in The Liberal Traditionin America, arguing
that we have a very narrow (and intolerant) political spectrum
because we never had a hereditary aristocracy against whom to
revolt, and have been unconscious of what our real political ideology has been all along. 291 That ideology-pragmatic philo285. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); URSULA K.
LEGUIN, DANCING AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: THOUGHTS ON WORKS, WOMEN,
PLACES (1989).
286. For a lucid discussion sympathetic to Freud, see Robin West, Law, Rights, and
Other Totemic Illusions: Liberal Legalism and Freud'sTheory of the Rule of Law, 134 U.
PA. L. REv. 817 (1986).
287. There is a story to suggest the sovereign is the living law, like Cooley's and
Moores's unwritten constitution. See William Klassen, The King as 'LivingLaw' with ParticularReference to Musonius Rufus, I STUD. IN RELIGION 63 (1985) (discussing Hellenistic Kingship and nomos empsychos ("animate law")).
288. For the necessity of the cooperative "George" in the building of governmental
communities, see Carol Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectivesfrom Game Theory,
Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN, 37 (1990).
289. See Rose, supra note 284, at 80.
290. See generally ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA

(1980) (discussing the dilemma of "the people" as "originators of the basic law of the
land").
291. LoUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955) (seeking to
explain the absence in American political theory of socialists or "continental"
conservatives).
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sophical liberalism-is too shallow, Hartz and his considerable
contemporary progeny agree, though they disagree about what
the correct, more deeply founded political theory should be.292
Remember the first real text in volume two: "When in the
course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to
dissolve the political bonds which have connected them to
another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station ....-293 This is the statement of a child's

emancipation, but now that we have left the father, how are we
to be brothers and sisters? 294 We had little theory besides "on
our own" when we left. I would suggest that Populism was one
of the early attempts to ground America's political debate more
profoundly after the Civil War.
XIII.

POPULISM

America's identity crisis was particularly poignant in
Nebraska at the turn of the century. This was the center of the
country at the turn of the hundred-year mark in United States
history. People in Kearney, so my students tell me, believed it
would be made the nation's capital because of its central location. In the heart of America there had arisen an eloquent voice
in the name of the people. That voice came from William Jennings Bryan, an orator of unparalleled gift. Yet all around his
movement swirled confusion. Why was it to come to so little, to
the ignominy of the Scopes trial, to Kearney in oblivion? You
may decide, but I will make some suggestions before we begin
the last layer of context. I will point in two directions, one past
and one toward the future.
The first direction is directly behind the Populists-because
they came after the demise of the Native American nation, the
"twilight of the Sioux" of which Nebraska Laureate John
Neihardt sings.295 The song of the Populists (and they sang, literally, a great deal)2 96 is an echo, in confusion, of the cry of the
people--the people of Black Elk.297 We came, white settlers,
and claimed Nebraska by plat map and by law, laying out towns
292.
293.
294.
anyway?"
295.

See id.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
What happened to Mom? For the place for Mom and the question "who is she,
see Rose, supra note 288.
JOHN G. NEIHARDT, THE TWILIGHT OF THE Sioux (1925).

296. ROBERT W. CHERNEY, POPULISM, PROGRESSIVISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF NEBRASKA POLITICS, 1885-1915, at xiii-xiv, (1981).
297. See J. NEIHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKS (University of Neb. Press 1962) (1932).
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like cookie pressings by each railroad depot. 298 We put our
imprint on the land when we were not yet here, as if there had
been no one here first. 29 9 But the land was haunted, and the cry
of the people was the land calling for her own, and getting in
return, at first, only the letter of the law. Today, Nebraska has
people who have lived, fought, and loved her history and land
for generations. At the turn of the century, we were all outsiders
and did not know it. Today, even James Kirkpatrick 3°° realizes
that we have forgotten the Native Americans-although the one
thing I feel sure of, in the final context of this Article, is that the
land has not. 1
What we did was to lay down the law, literally, on the
3
land. °2 And that is what created the worst of the confusion.
We left our father, but we did not recognize our brothers and
sisters. We imported old law to a new place and tried to impose
it. Even the white settlers, once settled, resisted that external
imposition.3 °3 The city council in Omaha resisted the centralized law from Lincoln. Populism from the top down did not
work very well; it risked being a contradiction in terms.
The second direction in which I point, to decipher the
demise and confusion of Populism, is to the future. We forgot
not only who was here first, when we came, but also we forgot
who came with us. The women. A political movement that
claims to go to the very roots, the grass roots, the radical basis of
sovereignty, cannot leave out half of the people who live at the
level of the grass. The radical refers to a root, to what is inherent and fundamental, to what pertains to the moisture inherent
in animals and plants, to water from the ground. 3° If we are to
continue to move in our spiral dance so that it is life-giving, we
must circle around and up to include the women of Nebraska.
298. See DOROTHY W. CREIGH, NEBRASKA: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 104-06
(1977); 1 J.S. MORTON & A. WATKINS, ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF NEBRASKA 166 (1905).

299. For a thoughtful exploration of "laying down the law" on land including
Nebraska, and a sense of the violence of such an imposition, see C. Wilkinson, Law and the
American West: The Searchfor an Ethic of Place, 59 COLO. L. REv. 401 (1988).
300. See Editorials, LINCOLN J., June 29, 1990, at 10.
301. See PETER MATrHIESSEN, INDIAN COUNTRY 5-13 (1979).
302. For a discussion of the Quaker tradition's way of avoiding this violent version of
laying down the law, see Howard J. Vogel, The JudicialOath and the American Creed, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 1107, 1119 (1990). For the story of another version of the lineaments of
the law of the land, in this case the law of the land in Australia, see BRUCE CHATWIN, THE
SONGLINES (1987).

303. Rose, supra note 284, at 84, 91.
304. For the relation of ground and water to the feminine, see HELEN M. LUKE,
WOMAN, EARTH AND SPIRIT: THE FEMININE IN SYMBOL AND MYTH (1984).
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That spiral motion, that very tornado mentioned by the contemporary Nebraska court in 1986 in the Omaha National Bank
case, 30 5 is one that catches Dorothy up and sets her temporarily

in Oz, but which finally lands her home. The dizziness is part of
another way home.
XIV.

THE CONTEXT OF NEBRASKA'S HISTORY

We are ready to try the most open-ended "outer" layer of
context, the historical record outside the texts of Nebraska law
in its official guise and also outside the level of the newspaper
history we relied on above. The main sources of history so far
were two prominent newspapers, the Omaha World Herald and
the Omaha Daily Bee. We now add other papers and some of
the historical commentaries on Nebraska, Populism, and the city
of Omaha. We should not be surprised, in fact we should
expect, that there will be inconsistencies, tensions, and
paradoxes.
In his work Omaha: The Gate City and Douglas County
Nebraska, Arthur Wakely notes that the first mention of fire
protection in the records of the Omaha city council was on
October 27, 1857.306 On March 22, 1866, the year before
Nebraska's statehood, Omaha established a police force of four
men. 30 7 Early on, the populace tied their police and fire protection to the city government. In September 1865, in response to
solicitation of contributions for the purchase of Omaha's first fire
engine, "the people took the view that, as they paid taxes to support the8 city government, the engine should be purchased by the
30
city."
In 1878, Burch's Nebraska as It Is 309 reported Omaha as

the county seat of Douglas County (organized in 1855), with
four daily and eleven weekly newspapers, and a city population
of 26,000.310 By 1887, both the police and fire departments had
full-time, paid staffs. However, in March of 1887, the Lincoln
legislature passed the act at issue in Moores, and on May 10,
1887, the police commissioners, appointed by Governor Thayer
305. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
306. 1 ARTHUR C. WAKELY, OMAHA: THE GATE CITY AND DOUGLAS COUNTY
NEBRASKA 115 (1917).
307. Id. at 118; see also JAMES W. SAVAGE & JOHN J. BELL, THE HISTORY OF THE
CITy OF OMAHA AND SOUTH OMAHA (1976).
308. 1 WAKELY, supra note 306, at 117.
309. L.D. BURCH, NEBRASKA AS IT Is 27 (1878).
310. Id.
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under the new legislation, took office.3 11 The board met nine
days later and appointed a police chief3 12-- but the city council
would not accept the appointment. 3 The judiciary committee
of the council concluded that the board of gubernatorial appointees were "without the necessary rules and regulations to be prescribed by ordinance," and thus had no authority; the necessary
ordinance was pending before the council. 314 As we know from
Moores, the first challenge to this new board and its appointees
came in State v. Seavey. 315 In terms of practical results, the crisis
over Seavey's appointment as police chief resulted in all members of the "old" police department keeping their jobs, the calling of a public mass meeting to force the council to pay the
police, and the apparent continuation of the police department
as it had existed prior to the state legislation.3 16 The fire department was more shaken up; fourteen old employees were
ousted. 7
In July 1892, the Populist National Convention was held in
Omaha, attracting 10,000 delegates and observers.318 In 1894
and 1896, with the support of William Jennings Bryan,319 Populist Silas Holcomb was elected governor.32 ° Soon after his reelection, Holcomb acted on a new bill called "the Omaha Charter," which gave him power to appoint the Omaha Police and
Fire Commission, appointing four men, one of whom, R.E.L.
Herdman, was appointed to hold a one year term ending in
April 1898.321
Holcomb's appointees were challenged in January 1898, in
Omaha district court.322 Judge Cunningham R. Scott found that
vesting appointment power in Lincoln for officials in Omaha violated the right to local self-government.323 It is in Holcomb's
311. 1 WAKELY, supra note 306, at 119.
312. Omaha's FirstPolice Chief, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Mar. 31, 1975, at 3.
313. E.D.F. MOREARTY, OMAHA MEMORIES 183 (1917).

314. Id. at 119.
315. 35 N.W. 228 (1887).
316. 1 WAKELY, supra note 306, at 120.

317. Id.
318. DOROTHY D. DUSTIN, OMAHA AND DOUGLAS COUNTY: A PANORAMIC HISTORY 83 (1980).
319. 2 J.S. MORTON & A. WATKINS, ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF NEBRASKA 259

(1905-13).
320. WAKELY, supra note 306, at 120.
321. OMAHA EVENING BEE, Jan. 12, 1898, at 1.

322. Id.
323. Id.
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response to that decision by Scott that we find perhaps the best
"other side" to the Moores rationale.
On January 12, 1898, the Omaha Evening Bee reported that
Judge Scott had that morning decided that the law providing for
the appointment of a police and fire commission for Omaha by
the governor was unconstitutional.324 The decision was in
response to a petition for writ of mandamus by two attorneys
directed to Mayor Moores to appoint his own board.325
Although Scott declined to issue the writ, he said that the
mayor, in conjunction with the city council, had authority to
provide for the government of the police and fire departments in
Omaha.326 His opinion begins with de Tocqueville: "Local
assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations.
Municipal institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to
science; they bring it within the people's reach ....
"327 He continues with a series of authorities, prominent among them Judge
Dillon of Iowa. Although Dillon is famous in local government
law for "Dillon's Rule," which makes municipal corporations
the creatures of the legislature, Dillon, like Cooley, was a prolific
author who spanned the tensions of his topic and sometimes
tipped into what might look like contradiction. 32 Thus, Dillon
is quoted by Scott for the contrary of "Dillon's rule": he says
the stature of local government rests "in all our legislation, and
is expressedly or impliedly guaranteed in our state constitutions.1 329 Scott commented on section one of the state constitu-

tion; he concluded that the people are and have been since
Creation, endowed with rights, hence inalienable rights, hence
rights "greater than all constitutions; all legislatures; and hence
any act of any legislature" that violates those rights is absolutely
null. 330 The rights, he says, need no constitutional recognition
or declaration, because they are the unchangeable foundations of
a republican form of government-"an inheritance of a free people from the foundation of the world to the end of time. A legislature may do a great many things, but it cannot repeal God's
324. Id.
325. Id.

326. Id.
327. Respondent's Objections at 10 exhibit A, State v. Kennedy, 60 Neb. 300 (1900)
(No. 11,226).

328. The counter to Dillon's thesis was offered by Eugene McQuillin. See EUGENE
MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1911); see also Gerald E. Frug,

The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV L. REv. 1059, 1114 (1980).
329. See Respondent's Objections at 10 exhibit A, Kennedy (No. 11,226).
330. Id. at 5.
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endowments" of inalienable rights or the declaration of American independence. 331 He names and founds his opinion on the
Creator: a different one from the creator and author in Savage-an express deity, not a state. He cites the right of local
self-government as one of the strongest and most efficient checks
in our system of checks and balances, and concludes that
Holcomb's four appointees have no lawful claim to their offices,
so they are vacant offices to be filled by local measures.332
Rosewater is more direct in his economic analysis of law:
"In a nutshell.., if the commissioners are municipal officers, to
be paid salaries out of the city treasury, their titles must be
derived from the people of the city. ' 333 Two days later, the Bee
and the World Herald carried a response to Scott's decision,
written by Governor Holcomb.334 Holcomb pronounced Scott's
decision, in effect, mere dicta. He complains that Scott took a
mandamus suit and expressed what was a "masterly" argument
in favor of "the most liberal application of the principle of home
rule" in the wrong place. 335 Holcomb claimed it should have
been a speech to the legislature.336 He characterized Scott's
decision as an extreme response to the potential of legislative
abuse, which made every court a law unto itself, "and this is
anarchy and anarchy is as deplorable as despotism. ' 337 He felt
that the issue of local government had to be determined on some
definite, fixed and certain rule, but asked the obvious: who sets
the rules? He determined that the entire question, the full trust,
is to rest in the state legislature. Section 26, which seems on its
face to provide for the retention by the people of those powers
not explicitly delegated elsewhere to the government, appears
lost: "There is no other way except through the law making
body which is composed of their (the people's) duly chosen
338
representatives."
Two years later, on June 7, 1900, the Nebraska Supreme
Court issued two opinions related to Moores. In State v. Kennedy, an action explicitly instituted in order to overrule Moores,
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 12 exhibit B.
Editorials,OMAHA EVENING BEE, Jan. 14, 1898, at 5.
Id.
Id. A home rule statute was established in 1909.
Id.
At this point, the initiative did not exist in Nebraska. See Fischer, supra note
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the court failed to act against Moores.33 9 In the other, the
Supreme Court, de novo on their own initiative, heard charges of
criminal constructive contempt against Rosewater. 340 What was
his contempt? He had criticized Holcomb for sitting in on the
Kennedy case, as Holcomb had pledged the reversal of
Moores,341 and had, as governor, made the appointments now
under challenge, and was in June of 1900 no longer governor,
but a sitting justice of the Nebraska Supreme Court.342 In the
course of the Kennedy case,34 3 the brief that challenged
Holcomb's objectivity-in a retrial of a case he had denounced
in print as governor and had pledged to combat-was ordered
stricken from the file. But by the time of that order to strike,
something had happened to Lee Herdman-he became reporter
for the state, and clerk of the Supreme Court. In the Bee, the
rumor that Holcomb pledged Moores's reversal was alleged to
have been spread by the "Herdmanites." The same paper
announced a week later that Holcomb arranged a deal with the
Democratic leaders in Douglas County to give the reporter-clerk
spot to Herdman, 34 although by January 21, 1900, the Bee
reported a "Hot Fight for Clerkship" between Herdman and
another former Populist and Democrat.345 On February 14, the
Bee 346 reported that Herdman had the call, due to infighting
that included the "Herdman junta of the Jacksonian Club"
within the Democratic Party.347
By this point, the Herdman trail crosses and recrosses too
finely. The record begins to shred. We cannot follow Lee Herdman any further in the historical tissue.348 Omaha and Nebraska
histories describe a welter of parties and factions, of Democrat,
Populist, "Fusionist," and "silver Democrats," and even juntas
of Jacksonian clubs among Populist-Democrats (Herdman and
his brother William), but the weaving is too erratic to sustain a
reading.349 We hear reports of "frenetic political activity that
339. 83 N.W. 87, 88 (Neb. 1900).
340. State v. Rosewater, 83 N.W. 353, 354 (Neb. 1900).
341. Factors in the Election, OMAHA EVENING BEE, Nov. 8, 1899, at 1.
342. D.P. STOUGH, THE SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA 540 (1917).

343. State v. Kennedy, 83 N.W. 87 (1900).
344. OMAHA EVENING BEE, Nov. 16, 1899, at 5.
345. Hot Fightfor Clerkship, OMAHA EVENING BEE, Jan. 21, 1900, at 1.

346. Lee Herdman Has the Call, OMAHA EVENING BEE, Feb. 14, 1900, at 5.
347. Never Such FlagrantBossism as That in Democratic Party, OMAHA EVENING
BEE, Feb. 5, 1900, at 4.

348. See, eg., supra note 193.
349. - See, e.g., 1 WAKELY, supra note 306.
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dominated the Omaha newspapers between 1880 and 1904 [that]
diminished somewhat with the election to the Senate of 1905 of
Gilbert Hitchcock, editor of the World Herald and with the
death in 1906 of Edward Rosewater. ' 350 Rosewater was held
personally in contempt by Justice Holcomb after a shoot-out:
Holcomb, the sole justice facing Rosewater pro se, Rosewater
with his own stenographer so careful of the record, 351 but the
record is disintegrating. There is no record that Rosewater paid
a fine or of any further proceedings. Right before the first contempt hearing, Lee Herdman was sworn in as clerk of the
supreme court.3 5 2
A year and a half later, "as Predicted Exclusively by the
World Herald, ' 353 the Redell case overruled Moores. Attorney
Connell, the Bee reported,354 thought that the part of Redell that
seemed to overrule Moores was mere dictum.355 A year later,
Governor Savage had not taken advantage of Redell, refusing to
appoint anyone to the commission. As we know already, "the
will has overcome reason," and Moores is the real law, as even
Sullivan admitted.356
During the time of Kennedy, Redell, and Savage (the try,
the apparent overruling, the concession to reality), what was
happening? The World Herald accused the Bee of failing to tell
the story that Omaha had a boss. Boss Dennison, a gambler out
of "the wild third ward," ran the town, the World Herald suggested. 357 Have we been getting the story of the 1968 Democratic National Convention without any mention of Mayor
Daly? Was all this court action a veneer, a play reported by Lee
Herdman that signifies nothing?
XV.

THE Boss-AND KING? SOVEREIGNS AND PIGS: THE

STORY OF A CITIZEN DETECTIVE

The Savage rule, stat pro ratione voluntas, is that the will

stands in the place of reason. 358 The Moores commission stood,

350. DUSTIN, supra note 318, at 92-93.
351. See OMAHA EVENING BEE, June 5, 1900, at 1; OMAHA EVENING BEE, June 6,
1900, at 1; OMAHA EVENING BEE, June 7, 1900, at 1.
352. Can Court Revive a Statute?, OMAHA EVENING BEE, May 2, 1990, at 4.
353. OMAHA EVENING BEE, Dec. 5, 1901, at 1.
354. Id.
355. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 175-80.
357. OMAHA EVENING BEE, Dec. 5, 1901, at 1.
358. See supra text accompanying note 178.
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but whose will kept it there? Sullivan declined to use the next
closest maxim, which would have identified the will with that of
the people. Was it the will of the boss? And, if so, what is the
relationship between the boss and the people? We noted above
that Populism from the top down, from Lincoln imposed on
Omaha, seemed to produce incoherence.3 5 9 But there was a kind
of coherence in Omaha, beginning in 1900, the year the first
assault on Moores (via the Kennedy case) was launched, continuing through 1901 when Redell ostensibly overturned Moores,
and through the concession to reality of the court in Savage.
Then, in 1904, Herdman returned to the police commission.
Who was in charge? What was the source of order, both in the
sense of predictability and in the sense of meaning?
The answer to the last question depends on the reader's
view of bossism, in general, and of Tom Dennison, in particular.3 r In 1900, Dennison's ascendency in Omaha was unofficially official. Let us look at this layer of context, the life and
times in Omaha, from the viewpoint of the historical political
analyst. One of the first things we find out in Orville Menard's
PoliticalBossism in Mid-America 361 is that this man who never
held public office in Omaha and was marginally literate had a
definite code of honor.362 His background as a gambler and
extralegal organizer of political power rested on a view of law
that gives a striking role to the people:
He believed that some people by nature are good, some bad,
and no amount of lawmaking was going to alter that basic fact.
Furthermore, he saw legislation as self limiting, since "Laws
that people don't believe in can't be enforced if whole armies
tried it. There are so many laws," he added, "that people are
either lawbreakers
or hypocrites. For my part, I hate a damn
3' 63
hypocrite.

Overall, Menard is not sympathetic to local government, and
attributes an undue fear of centralization in America as the
64
source of decentralized fragmentation and, thus, bossism.3
However, in the case of Omaha, Menard's narrative runs
359. See supra text accompanying notes 348-52.
360. For one discussion showing multiple perspectives on bossism, see J. NOONAN,
BRIBES 584-600 (1984).
361.

ORVILLE D. MENARD, POLITICAL BOSSISM IN MID-AMERICA (1989).

362. Id. at 18.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 36.
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counter to his own thesis: it was the state legislature's intrusive
actions that made the city ripe for Dennison's political machine.
The people working in city hall and the courthouse endured
over the years frequent bills passed by the Nebraska state legislature altering their governmental structures and powers ....
Paying little heed to the constitution's prohibition against passing local or special laws respecting incorporating cities, towns,
and villages, or changing or amending their charters, the legislature created in 1887 the category of metropolitan class for
Omaha.365
This legislative disregard for both constitution and city sentiment meant that Omaha officials' terms were set "according to
the legislators [sic] latest whim, "366 as were numbers, titles, electoral bases and election versus appointment. 67 Immediately following the description of city government created by the chaotic
dictation from Lincoln, Menard concludes, "Omaha in the early
1890s was a candidate for a political boss, someone capable of
amassing a following, penetrating complexity, and able to get
things done ....
"368 Menard describes Dennison as the pupil of
Edward Rosewater, and a member of the Rosewater-DennisonMoores machine at the turn of the century. 369 This became the
Dennison machine, with Jim Dahlman as the perpetual mayor,
and lasted until 1933.370 As part of the machine, the Bee was
reticent about Dennison; Menard notes that the Daily News, the
Examiner and the World-Herald criticized Dennison, but the
Bee was silent.37 '
Where is Lee Herdman in all of this? He does not appear in
the histories, not even in Menard's detailed chronicle of Omaha.
On the one hand, Menard notes that "[o]f all the agencies and
operations of local government, the most crucial to Tom Denni3' 72
son's political machine were the police and legal machinery,
and Dennison was superbly organized, gaining effective electoral
selection of the police commissioner, the chief of police, and
365. Id. at 46.
366. Id.
367. Id.

368. Id. at 48.
369. Id. at 66-67.
370. Jim Dahlman, a Democrat, was the mayor of Omaha from 1906 to 1918 and
again from 1921 to 1930. Dahlman was opposed politically by Herdman. See Mayor
James 0. Dahlman Speaks at Nebraska, WORLD HERALD: OMAHA, Aug. 1, 1910, at 5.
371. MENARD, supra note 361, at 67.
372. Id. at 223.
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other officers.373 On the other hand, there is some suggestion
that the "Jacksonian Club" (in which the Herdmans had their
"junta") challenged Dennison.374 In 1906 the Club took a
strong shot at an electoral theme of law enforcement directed
against Dennison, and was partly successful. 5 Thus, Herdman's ascendency to the police commissioner post in 1904 may
have marked him as a foe of Dennison. Did he stay opposed to
this boss who crossed party lines in order to run an efficient city
when the government affixed from Lincoln could not? And
which "law" was the law of the people, their sovereign? These
questions lie in the "real political context"-a phrase used by
376
Sullivan in Redell to overrule Moores.
Hendrik Hartog, in a charming article in the Wisconsin Law
Review entitled Pigs and Positivism,377 tells the story of pig-keeping on the streets of nineteenth century New York. He demonstrates that, despite a colorful trial in which the mayor's struggle
to de-pig the city and a pig-keeper's resistance resulted in a judgment that keeping pigs on city streets was a criminal nuisance,
the practice of pig-keeping on city streets continued for at least
thirty years after the decision outlawed it. Hartog investigates
the potential class bias against pigs, 378 the dearth of common
law,3 79 the ways of butchers, 380 and the "artisanal community of
pig-keepers, ' ' 3 8 1 and concludes that the members of a politically

active and insistent community of New Yorkers believed pigkeeping to be their right, while those opposed to the social practice were unwilling and unable to do what was necessary to stop
it.38 2 "The legal right to keep pigs in New York City's streets
was constituted both by the activities of the right's defenders and
by the relative passivity and ineffectuality of its opponents. 38 a
Hartog interprets this as a kind of legal order; he documents that
those who continued to keep pigs considered themselves not
only righteous but also lawful.38 4 Tom Dennison considered
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. at 224.
Id. at 104.
See supra notes 348-52 and accompanying text.
See Redell v. Moores, 88 N.W. 243 (Neb. 1901).
Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 899.
Id. at 902-04, 908-12.
Id. at 906-08.
Id. at 917-18.
Id. at 933.
Id.
Id
Id.
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himself righteous, and not a hypocrite. What was the status of
those who tried to rule Omaha from Lincoln, who dragged
newspaper editors before them sua sponte, who reached to overrule cases, who finally made a legal maxim of non-letter-law,
into law? When the will of the people in Omaha kept the reality
of the Moores case the law, what kind of law was the letter, and
who was the sovereign? Was Tom Dennison called King Gambler in derision by those who posed themselves as "legitimate"
candidates but could not run a city? ass Who was sovereign?
Hartog suggests that our conventional legal theory makes it
impossible to account for the legal consciousness of groups like
the pig keepers, the citizens of Omaha, or of Daly's Chicago.
"In defining law as the command of the sovereign we ordinarily
deny the legitimacy of interpretive stances other than thoselike the [Lincoln legislature and courts]-which have the benefit
of formal authoritativeness. Although the sovereign in American political ideology incorporates the pig keepers," the way we
see government rejects their participatory role and creates a false
unitary vision of the sovereign.38 6 We do this, he suggests, "to
maintain our valued vision of law as a (single) text.1 38 7 But we
already know better, here in this weave of texts and contexts in
the Heartland. We know there are so many strands, dimensions,
thicknesses, and colors in our social fabric that pulling on one
thread, one wrong annotation, can unravel the entire thing. Our
unraveling leaves the fabric still somehow in the main intactyet our vision has changed. We know how deceptive each piece
of text can be. We know Lee Herdman has two sides and more,
that Omaha was really organized by Boss Dennison 3s8 yet also
inspired by William Jennings Bryan at the same time. We know
that pig keepers kept the mayor at bay, but not forever. We
know that the law has many sides, many perspectives-and no
single authoritative one, yet there was still law in Omaha,
Nebraska, in 1898 and 1900 and 1902.
The people keep the power because they know they are not
solely the creations of the state; the government, whether one
branch or all in concert, did not author them. Nebraskans know
385. For a sobering view of less overt and organized "private government," see Joel
Garreau, The Shadow Governments, WASH. POST, June 14, 1987, at Al.
386. Hartog, supra note 377, at 934.
387. Id.
388. Yet, to use Derridean word play, note that ultimate insider Dennison's homonym--denizen--comes from "foreigner admitted to residence," which applies to all nonNative Americans, at the least.
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that as deeply as New Englanders, despite Herdman's annotations about how in Nebraska the towns did not precede the government.3 8 9 When they came to Nebraska, the people knew
themselves haunted by those already there, and they knew that
the grids laid down by railroad engineers did not create communities. Nebraska was one of the first states in the Union to name
for its people the sovereign power that most other states must
exercise in opinion polls. Nebraska was among the first states to
create the direct initiative power of her people to amend the
Constitution.390 Although the principle had been invisible
before, in 1912 article III, section 2 of the Nebraska Constitu"[t]he first power reserved by the people is the
tion stated that
'39 1
initiative.
This reclamation of a hitherto unnamed retained right is
part of the people finding themselves. It entails risk; Charles
Black reminds us that the "only hitch" with unnamed rights:
"in short,... the rights unenumerated are not enumerated. We
are not told what they are. ' 392 We have to find such rights out
by living and discussing our laws and discussing them. In Book
IX of The Republic, Socrates says that each person can be subject to an inner sovereign, but, "failing that," the outer sovereign
rules.393 We are sovereign in as much as we participatefrom our
own sovereignty, "equal and united" in a people.394
We found in our pursuit of an anomalous annotation a textmaker of extraordinary interest. 395 Lee Herdman, hidden in
plain sight, entered our legal-text-book-land at the outset of
Moores as "R.E.L. Herdman," having been police commissioner
of the city of Omaha. He edited, commented, labeled, elaborated, Latinized, uttered an exit cry of protest, and returned to
the story outside our "legal" text. His journey is from the land
of the pig keepers into the law books and back to the streets.
Did he enfold himself in Dennison's machine, this man whose
389. Herdman, supra note 105, at 232-33.

390. For a discussion of the literature on participatory mechanisms like initiative,
Clayton Gillette, Plebiscites,Participation,and Collective Action in Local Government Law,
86 MicH. L. REv. 930 (1988).
391. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2.
392. Charles Black, On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in POWER AND
POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1985).
393. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 29, at 311.
394. Id. at 7.
395. Due to the unavailability of the author's research materials, the editors are
unable to verify the following information. This information is integral to the author's
story and will therefore be presented notwithstanding the unavailability of the sources.
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obituary said he was reputed to have been W.J. Bryan's secretary (but Bryan's biography does not mention him) because law,
like grammar, is merely a matter of fashion, like pantaloons?
We know some of his eventual story-that he stepped in to clean
up an insurance regulation problem near the end of his life-but
the rest is a matter of his reputedly wide-ranging political
acquaintances. In such a web of friends, how could Tom Dennison have been missed? Yet the real mystery may be the smaller
fish, W.W. Cox. He is the chief of detectives who sued for back
pay. He was reported only in the shadow volumes of Herdman's
short-lived unofficial reporters. He was ousted in the era when
the city was being cleaned up for the 1898 Exposition. Then he
was reinstated, then removed for cause. He was discharged as
chief of detectives through the abolition of the post, on April 14,
1898. Herdman's one year term on the police commission had
expired the week before April 14; the commission discharged
Cox as soon as Herdman was gone. On November 1, 1898, Cox
returned to the force to fill a vacancy for captain of police and
remained until discharged for cause." It turns out that he was
appointed in 1895, told he was suspended but was not, as
another proceeding for injunction kept that suspension in suspense, so he continued to serve until April 1898 despite a further
order of suspension. He claimed he continued after April 1898,
until November 1898, and was entitled to back pay. On May 13,
1901, the city was ordered to make out a "proper pay roll and
certificate" for Cox, and pay him $585 plus interest. The ordinary means of collecting for being a police officer at this time,
apparently, was by mandamus. The two prior attempts to get
rid of Cox had resulted in his filing quo warranto actions, which
he won. During the April to November hiatus, he seems to have
worked at Swift & Company in south Omaha. From the
reporter, it would seem that the state sued on Cox's behalf
because he was caught in the post-Moores dance of who was in
and who was out. In 1901, Cox won, until Moores and the city
appealed; he lost.396 Menard notes that while the Lincoln legislature fiddled with the Omaha government, city employees often
397
did not know how or if they were to continue in their jobs.
The city more than once had two simultaneous commissions.398
396. Moores v. State ex rel. Cox, 4 Herd. 235, 240 (Neb. 1903).
397. MENARD, supra note 361, at 46.

398. This occurred in 1898, prior to State v. Moores, 76 N.W. 175 (1898), and in
1900, prior to State v. Kennedy, 83 N.W. 87 (1900).
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The case does not say that Cox performed no duties, nor that he
was unable to do so. It does not tell us when and why he was
discharged "for cause." We do not know if in 1901 he had a job
at Swift, or was unemployed with six kids at home. We do not
know if he tried to fit in the Dennison machine but failed, or if
he tried to fit in the Herdman text and failed. It is Cox whom I
leave to the reader.
When I was a child and a book did not turn out in a way I
could accept, I simply re-did the ending for myself. Cox is my
invitation to the reader to enter this text, and see what your
imagination can spin from the text, W.W. Cox's story. What
was it like for him in the world of Boss Dennison, W.J. Bryan,
39 9
and Lee Herdman? There are those, like Jorge Luis Borges,
who say it is all one text, all one story, in which we live. There
are those like Derrida who insist on the singularity of each story.
It is Orville Menard who says that "total truth" about Dennison
may not be found in his book on Dennison, but the effort at a
true rendering may at least suggest that "Se non e vero, e ben
trovato."4°° (Even if it's not true, it's believable.) Herdman initially insisted on a "single eye," but we humans live in a world of
multiple perspectives. 4 1 The only single eye is one we cannot
sustain. 4°2 I invite you to imagine a believable story for the fellow who, caught in the entwined texts of the multiple legal systems and the turnings of the "Case of the Moores Annotation,"
does not appear in print except in the shadow reporter.
Let me suggest a beginning. In all Derrida's writings about
Plato and Socrates and writing, he barely mentions Diotema.
Her name appears briefly in The Post Card.4°3 Yet she is the
central character in the Platonic succession. Plato writes (or, in
Derrida's version, speechwrites) that Socrates traces all journeying in philosophy and pursuit of the good, to the conversation in
the Symposium, with Diotema. She tells Socrates of where the
399. See Myma Solotorevsky, The Model of Midrash and Borges's Interpretive Tales
and Essays, in MIDRASH AND LITERATURE 253 (Geoffrey Hartman & Sanford Budick

eds., 1989).
400. MENARD, supra note 361, at xiii.

401. For the relationship between the multiple perspectives in modem art and in legal
reality, see David Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1656 (1986). For a story
version of the necessity of more than one perspective, see WALKER PERCY, THE THANATOS SYNDROME 128-39 (1987).

402. Philosopher Thomas Nagel calls this "the God's eye view." See THOMAS
NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986). The "single eye" is depicted on the United
States one dollar bill. See M. TAYLOR, TEARS (1992).
403. See, e.g., DERRIDA, supra note 2, at 55.
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highest good and its perception lie, if he can journey there. She
has been there (or is she just leading Socrates on?). If there is
anything to Socrates besides irony, it is that he was taught
(inspired) by Diotema, as he taught Plato, who taught Aristotle,
who taught Alexander the Great (the original Boss of the Greek
story?). Diotema is foundational, yet barely visible in the text. I
would ask you for a moment to imagine that W.W. Cox was, like
a character in Shakespearean comedy, a woman (Winefred,
Wendy, Willa) in disguise-but that may be asking too much.
Maybe it is even too much to imagine that he was (part)
Indian, 4 African American, Mexican, or Jewish? I simply suggest that W.W. Cox was an honest but illiterate, and, somehow,
inspiring confederate of Herdman, who was gotten rid of the
week following Herdman's first exit from the commission. Cox
lost the appeal in 1903. In 1904, Herdman returned to the
board. By what law would you continue the story?
XVI.

CONCLUSION

Sullivan, the very man who wrote to overturn Moores, later
declared that Moores "stands in place of the law." 405 Herdman,
the man who carved the tombstone with the epitaph ("overtomb" or "over-duties") 4° 6 "IV OVERRULED IN TOTO, ' 4 7
uttered the prophetic cry against words unconnected with their
true, deadly effect - meaningless words. (Tom Dennison might
add, hypocritical words.) We have found that there is, indeed,
nothing outside the text, or, as Derrida would explain it, nothing
outside-the-text. °8 That is, everything is in the text, is context,
and there is never sufficient context to know fully. The only
thing left outside the text is nothing, or the Author. Even if we
do not know who the author is, every attempt at either defining
the author away or appropriating authorship totally will fail,
and we are left with our dance within the text, our part in
authorship. The one thing we know is that there is no definitive
edition. Volume two of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska is not
definitive; it has two annotations to the same case that are in
404. "Indian," it has been suggested, not because Columbus was disoriented but
because the native people were una genta in Dios, a people in God. MATrHIESSEN, supra
note 301, at 3.
405. State v. Savage, 90 N.W. 898, 901 (Neb. 1902); see supra text accompanying
notes 177-81, 358.
406. THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY

407. See supra note 17 and accomapnying text.
408. See, e.g., DERRIDA, supra note 32, at 85.

(1986).
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contradiction. But what that tension has created is the other
side of the story. There are the people, and there are the people,
and then there are the people. Populism is for the people, but is
Populism from the top down an inherent contradiction? Was
Bryan fated, by his very faith in "the people," never to be their
President? Is a Populist President an oxymoron or an ideal
never to be realized? We have found that the people exist in
many guises and that they are sovereign, but "they" (we) are still
coming to know what that means.
I would suggest that it means that at least the annotations
should put the Moores rationale under each section of the constitution, and also the best of the Redell rationale (the Harte dissent), the one which fears judicial anarchy. These two sides (and
there are, as I hope we have seen, more than that) are what one
commentator calls "nested opposition," 4 9 that is, seeming opposites which are really circling one another to get turned right.
That requires a move which is very difficult, and yet I believe
there is an old American Quaker song to describe that move,
which is also very simple:
When true simplicity is gained
To bow and to bend we shall not be ashamed
To turn, to turn will be our delight
Til by turning, turning, we come round right.
There is a relationship between how we turn inside and how we
turn outside, between the law in the heart and land, and the law
in our heart/land:
As for law, it too partakes of the radical uncertainty of the
rest of life, the want of firm external standards. But it is also a
special way of living on these conditions, a way of making standards internally,
out of our experience, as we make ourselves in
4 10
our talk.

XVII.

POSTLUDE

If Herdman is the scarecrow, he gets to govern Oz in the
Wizard's absence, once he has realized he has a brain (and is
more than a Chinese copyist). The Lion, however, in the book,
goes back to the forest, to be the king of the forest of which he
sings in the movie. He is crowned, with his broken flower pot,
409. See J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669 (1990) (reviewing JOHN
M. ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION (1989)).
410. JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 267 (1990).

1196

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

acknowledged by all the characters. He is a forester 411 -is that
what Tom Dennison was? The flowerpot king in the real law of
the city, under "officials" elected and reelected by the people,
affirming the order he maintained? But who is sovereign now, in
the absence of effective bosses? Not the Wizard, not the lion, not
the scarecrow, not the woodsman. Where are Dorothy and
Toto, anyway? But that is another story.

411. For the hint of his "lawful counterpart," consider the words of Sir Thomas
More in A Man for All Seasons:
Roper: Then you set man's law above God's! More: No, far below; but let me
draw your attention to a fact - I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right
and wrong, which you find such plain sailing, I can't navigate. I'm no voyager.
But in the thickets of law, oh, there I'm a forester.
ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 65-66 (1960).

